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Occupied Territories: The Case of Israel’s
Security Barrier
Dr. Barry A. Feinstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

Apartheid Wall Is a Human Rights Violation1 reads part of the title to an article
referring to a report attributed to the International Committee of the Red Cross.
According to another piece, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights “strongly
condemned human rights violations of the Israeli occupation authorities in the occupied
Palestinian territory . . .”2 and “also strongly condemned the Israeli occupation of the
territories as being . . . a flagrant violation of human rights. It strongly condemned the
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1
Apartheid Wall Is a Human Rights Violation Says Red Cross, AFP, Feb. 18, 2004,
http://www.mediareviewnet.com/Apartheid%20Wall%20is%20a%20human%20rights%20violation%20sa
ys%20Red%20Cross.htm [hereinafter Human Rights Violation]. Nevertheless, this article is actually an
additional posting of a prior (albeit the same) article entitled Barrier Wall is a Violation - Red Cross, AFP,
Feb. 18, 2004, http://iafrica.com/news/worldnews/303495.htm [hereinafter Barrier Wall]. The difficulties
(and importance) of nomenclature and the relevance of language are made apparent in these two almost
identical postings. In the text of both of these articles specific (and pedantic) reference is made to alleged
international humanitarian law violations and indeed they go on to painstakingly explain that the ICRC is
condemning violations of international humanitarian law. Barrier Wall, supra. Reference is not made in
these articles to international human rights violations, even though the title to one of the articles refers to
human rights violations. Human Rights Violation, supra. According to the body of both of these articles,
though, the opinion of the International Committee of the Red Cross “‘the West Bank Barrier, in as far as
its route deviates from the ‘Green Line’ into occupied territory, is contrary to IHL (International
humanitarian law),’ the International Committee of the Red Cross said in a statement . . . . ‘The ICRC
therefore calls upon Israel not to plan, construct or maintain this barrier within occupied territory’ as this
would have serious humanitarian and economic consequences for thousands of Palestinians.” Barrier Wall,
supra (emphasis added); Human Rights Violation, supra (emphasis added).
2
Commission Adopts Three Resolutions on the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab
Territories, RELIEF WEB, Apr. 15, 2004,
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/25b7fca7333d8adb85256e77006e1aff (emphasis
added).

Vol. 4:2]

Barry A. Feinstein

construction of the Israeli wall in the occupied Palestinian territory.”3 In these and
similar manners it is typically contended that “[t]he harm” caused by “[t]he measure of
constructing the wall within the occupied Palestinian territory and related measures taken
by the Government of Israel” includes, inter alia, “[i]nfringements on the freedom of
movement contrary to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”4 Among
other violations, continue these allegations, are Israel’s “[i]nfringements on the rights to
education, work and adequate standard of living contrary to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights . . . .”5 Typical specific allegations of human rights violations by Israel commonly
include checkpoints or roadblocks, closures, and curfews that restrict the freedom of
movement, 6 as well as the destruction of homes and agricultural property. 7
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN WARTIME
¶2

Although “International Humanitarian Law applies to situations of belligerent
occupation as well as situations where hostilities rise to the level of armed conflict,” it
has been said that its application “does not preempt the application of international
human rights law . . . . In situations of this complexity, both legal regimes complement
and reinforce each other.”8 The International Court of Justice, as well, considered that
international human rights law also operates in times of armed conflict. 9 The
Interna tional Court has pointed out that in light of the fact that “the territories occupied
by Israel have for over 37 years been subject to its territorial jurisdiction as the occupying
Power,” Israel “[i]n the exercise of the powers available to it on this basis, . . . is bound
by the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.”10 The Court consequently believes that international human rights law is indeed
applicable “within the Occupied Palestinian Territory,”11 and that “[t]he wall, along the
route chosen, and its associated régime gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians
residing in the territory occupied by Israel . . . . The construction of such a wall

3

Id. (emphasis added); Press Release, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Commission
Adopts Three Resolutions on the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, U.N. Doc.
HR/CN/1086 (Apr. 15, 2004).
4
See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, Annex II Summary Legal Position of the Palestine Liberation Organization,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/248 (Nov. 24, 2003).
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., John Dugard, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied by Israel Since 1967, Delivered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/256 (Aug. 12, 2004) (submitted in accordance with Commission
resolution 1993/2 A).
7
Id.
8
See Hearts and Minds: Post-War Civilian Deaths in Baghdad Caused by U.S. Forces, 15 No. 9(E)
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH 1, 7 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraq1003/6.htm (last
visited Nov. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Hearts and Minds].
9
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J sec. 106 (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm.
10
Id. sec. 112.
11
Id. sec. 114.
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accordingly constitutes breaches by Israel of several of its obligations under the
applicable international humanitarian law and human rights instruments.”12
But are issues such as the legality of Israel’s security barrier indeed within the
domain of international human rights law? There are three basic lines of reasoning, two
of which will be briefly mentioned and the third of which will be analyzed more
extensively, that lead to an answer of “no” to this question. In other words, international
law does not view such matters as belonging to the realm of human rights, and as a result
the situation of human rights in the West and Gaza is not the responsibility of Israel. 13
First of all, pursuant to the Oslo Accords, most Palestinian communities were
turned over to the control of the Palestinian Authority, which created a situation in which
“Israel does not have direct control over all the Occupied Territories, and more than 90
percent of the Palestinian population is under the civil and security control of the
Palestinian Authority . . . .”14 Thus, even assuming that the regime of international
human rights were applicable to occupied territories as such, the overwhelming majority
of persons in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are living under direct Palestinian (and
therefore not Israeli) control and hence are not under Israel’s jurisdiction as a result of the
transfer to the Palestinian Authority of responsibility and authority over them pursuant to
various international agreements 15 between Israel and the Palestinians. 16 Israel
consequently has no effective control over them and logically is therefore not responsible
regarding individuals living under Palestinian rule. 17 Specifically according to Article
12

Id. sec. 137 (emphasis added).
See Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories, 37 I SRAEL LAW REVIEW 17, 26 (2003-2004) (cited reference and all subsequent
references herein to the article Living in Denial indeed identify the source of the relevant material
appearing in the text, yet the source nevertheless comes to different conclusions than those reached by the
author in relation to the applicability of the regime of international human rights to occupied territory).
14
B’T SELEM, THE ISRAELI INFORMATION CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,
ILLUSIONS OF RESTRAINT 4 (2000),
http://www.btselem.org/Download/200012_Illusions_of_Restraint_Eng.doc; see Israel’s Response in the
Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al., para. 498 [2005] IsrSC (in Hebrew,
on file with author).
15
See, e.g., Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements (Sept. 13, 1993),
http://www.israel.org/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Principles.htm
[hereinafter Declaration of Principles]; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agreement on the Gaza Strip and
the Jericho Area (May 4, 1994),
http://www.israel.org/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Agreement+on+Gaza+Strip+and
+Jericho+Area.htm; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agreement on Preparatory Powers and
Responsibilities (Aug. 29, 1994),
http://www.israel.org/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Agreement+on+Preparatory+Tra
nsfer+of+Powers+and+Re.htm; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers
and Responsibilities (Aug. 27, 1995),
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Further+Transfer+of+Powers+a
nd+Responsibilities.htm; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Sept. 28, 1995),
http://www.israel.org/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/THE+ISRAELIPALESTINIAN+INTERIM+AGREEMENT.htm. [hereinafter Interim]; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (Jan. 17, 1997),
http://www.israel.org/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Protocol+Concerning+the+Rede
ployment+in+Hebron.htm.
16
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 498.
17
See Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 38.
13
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XIX of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip Between the
Palestinians and Israel, their respective authorities must be exercised “with due regard to
internationally accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law.”18 Due
to the lack of effective Israeli control over Palestinians under Palestinian Authority
control, Israel is not responsible for their human rights. 19
The second reason why Israel’s security barrier is beyond the scope of human
rights law is that jurisdictional issues in this realm should be interpreted in a manner so as
to be applicable to those physically present in the State’s sovereign territory or otherwise
governed by its domestic laws, 20 in accordance with Article 29 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties which stipulates that “a treaty is binding upon each party in
respect to its entire territory.”21 The international law of human rights was principally
intended as governing the relationship between citizens and their own State. 22 The
obligations of the State and human rights relationship are based theoretically on the
legitimacy of government stemming from the agreement of those governed and the
government’s responsibility to preserve human rights, 23 for example, as the United States
Declaration of Independence stipulates, “all men . . . are endowed . . . with certain
unalienable Rights” and “[t]hat to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”24 The regime of
international human rights was consequently developed in the framework of this
relationship between individuals and their government. 25 “Human rights,” explains
Robert Kolb, are concerned with the organization of State power vis-à-vis the individual.
They are the product of the theories of the Age of Enlightenment and found their natural

18

Interim, supra note 15, at art XIX; see Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 38-39.
See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Summary Rec. of the 31st Meeting:
Consideration of Reports (Initial Report of Israel), paras. 38-39, UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/SR.31 (Nov. 19,
1998) available at
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/cf44b972b81a71f785256c780
057a971!OpenDocument; U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Summary record of
the 1251st meeting: Israel.11/03/98, para. 61, UN Doc.CERD/C/SR.1251 (Mar. 11, 1998), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CERD.C.SR.1251.En?Opendocument; Ben-Naftali & Shany,
supra note 13, at 26.
20
See Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 26, 33.
21
United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. XXIX, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v.
Prime Minister et al., supra note 14, para. 497. There is an exception to this stipulation if “a different
intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established . . . .” Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra art. XXIX.
22
See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of
Honor, 83 A M. J. INT ’L L. 461, 490 (1989); Robert Kolb, The Relationship Between International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: A Brief History of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 324 INT ’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 409 (1998), available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList168/85C81A4753C25BA9C1256B66005C4296; Steve
Charnovitz, The Globalization of Economic Human Rights, 25 BROOK. J. INT ’L L. 113, 119 (1999); BenNaftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 28, 35.
23
See Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 36.
24
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE , para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
25
See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence
Over Domestic Affairs, 83 A M. J. INT ’L L. 1, 37 (1989); Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 35; see also
Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty and Globalization, and Human Rights, et cetera, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1, 7 (1999); Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 221 (1999).
19
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expression in domestic constitutiona l law. In regard to England, mention may be made of
the 1628 Petition of Rights, the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act and the 1689 Bill of Rights; for
the United States of America, the 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights; for France, the 1789
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.”26
“Human rights law,” as G.I.A.D. Draper illuminates,
purports to govern part of the relations between government and governed
by setting limits to the intrusions by governments upon those areas of
human freedom thought to be essential for the proper functioning of the
human being in society and for his development therein. . . . These
freedoms, when internationalized in human rights instruments, are neither
intended nor adequate to govern an armed conflict between two States in a
condition of enmity. . . . The regime in no way purports to regulate the
conduct of the war between two States. . . . Hostilities and governmentgoverned relationships are different in kind, origin, purpose, and
consequences. Accordingly, the law that relates to them, respectively, has
the like differences. Human rights regimes and the humanitarian law of
war deal with different and distinct relationships. 27

¶7

Draper thus concludes that “human rights instruments are unable to afford the
content and quantity of the law necessary to control international armed conflicts . . . .”28
Hence, regarding situations of armed conflict, the possibility of transferring the regime of
human rights applicable within a State to the international sphere is nonexistent in light of
the innate and intrinsic antagonism between combat forces and the enemy population
during warfare and between the occupying authority and the occupied population in the
context of an occupation scenario. 29 “It goes without saying,” explains Yoram Dinstein,
that the relationship between an individual and an enemy state in wartime
is entirely different from the relationship between an individual and his or
her state (or any other state) in peacetime. If in peacetime one may
presume that a certain degree of goodwill characterizes the relations
between the state and at least many of the individuals to which it owes
certain obligations, in wartime no such presumption is valid vis-à-vis
enemy subjects. The situation is abnormal and it calls for a special legal
mechanism. 30

26

Kolb, supra note 22, at 409.
G.I.A.D. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, in REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND A RMED
CONFLICTS 145, 148 (M ICHAEL A. MEYER & HILAIRE M CCOUBREY eds., 1998).
28
Id.
29
See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law, in 2
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW : LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 345, 355 (THEODOR M ERON , ed.,
1984) [hereinafter Armed Conflict]; Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and
Human Rights, 8 I SR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 104, 116 (1978) [hereinafter Belligerent Occupation]; Ben-Naftali &
Shany, supra note 13, at 37.
30
Armed Conflict, supra note 29, at 355.
27
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¶8

Regarding the relationship between the occupying authority and the occupied
population, Dinstein elaborates: “The government of an occupied territory by the
occupant is not the same as a State’s ordinary government of its own territory: a military
occupation is not tantamount to a democratic regime and its objective is not the welfare
of the local population. Most peacetime human rights are suspended in time of
belligerent occupation.”31 He continues and points out that while nevertheless “the
powers of the occupant are circumscribed in a number of significant ways,” these
restrictions are in essence “designed to afford the civilian population of the area a
minimal protection of life, liberty and property, and of a few fundamental freedoms not
related to the state of war.”32 This limitation of applicability would of course apply to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights33 as well as to treaties such as the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms34 and the
American Convention on Human Rights.35
¶9
This second rationale is intricately tied in with the third fundamental reason, which
will now be analyzed in more depth, that issues like the legality of Israel’s security
barrier are outside the realm of international human rights law. Simply put, there is an
inherent contradiction between international humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflict situations and international human rights, and they are consequently two
mutually exclusive regimes. 36
¶10
The idea behind the regime of international humanitarian law is to govern the
behavior of a State involved in an armed conflict situation, and the rules and principles
were structured in the framework of obligations by which combatants were to abide. On
the other hand, the idea behind the regime of international human rights is its subjects’
receipt of a certain treatment, and this regime was accordingly designed as a sequence of
rights. 37 Louise Doswald-Beck and Sylvain Vite emphasize this by explaining that
interna tional humanitarian law “indicates how a party to a conflict is to behave in relation
to people at its mercy, whereas human rights law concentrates on the rights of the
recipients of a certain treatment.”38
¶11
Moreover, in order for the humanitarian framework in the Fourth Geneva
Convention, for instance, to apply, a condition of nationality or other status must exist
such as would make the person a “protected person.”39 In the words of Article 4:
“Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any
31

Belligerent Occupation, supra note 29, at 116.
Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
33
United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E,
95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
34
Council of Europe, The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms , Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
35
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, adopted Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
36
Draper, supra note 27, at 148, 149; see Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 26, 27, 28, 33.
37
See, e.g., Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Law, 293 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 94 (1993), available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList141/E59EC039BC5A8EE4C1256B66005985F0; BenNaftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 31.
38
Doswald-Beck & Vite, supra note 37.
39
See Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 4,
adopted on Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; BenNaftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 32.
32
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manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. Nationals of a
State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it.”40 International
human rights law, on the other hand, lays down no such conditions for its applicability. 41
The question whether the 1949 Geneva Conventions are applicable is furthermore
dependent upon whether the armed conflict is considered international or “not of an
international character.”42 Similarly, whether Protocol I 43 or whether Protocol II 44 of the
1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of
victims of armed conflicts is to be applied in any particular armed conflict situation is
dependent on whether the armed conflict is considered international in nature (in which
case Protocol I would apply) or non- international (in which case Protocol II would
apply).
In addition, while the principles of international human rights law may in certain
instances be derogated from, the rules of international humanitarian law may not be
derogated from for the simple reason that they were specifically developed to apply to
armed conflict situations. 45
In armed conflict situations the applicable regime is therefore that of international
humanitarian law and not that of international human rights, 46 since international
humanitarian law was developed particularly with armed conflicts in mind, and is thus
more suitable to address humanitarian issues that arise in these conflict situations. 47
During war, the international legal standards that apply are not always the same as
the legal standards that apply during peace. 48 This is but to state the obvious, since as
previously mentioned human rights law controls a State’s relationship with its citizens
(and this law is thus enforceable only vis-à-vis the citizen’s own State), whereas the laws
of war are intended to regulate antagonism between States, and may be enforced against
States and particular participants in the armed conflict. 49 Consequently, “one ought not to
40

Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 4.
See Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 32.
42
See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 3; Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 32.
43
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims in International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
44
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol
II].
45
See Armed Conflict, supra note 29, at 350-54; Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Inter-State
Wars and Human Rights, 7 I SR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 139, 148 (1977) [hereinafter Inter-State Wars]; see also B.
G. Ramcharan, The Role of International Bodies in the Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 33 A M. U. L. RE V. 99, 105-10 (1983);
Oren Gross, “Once More unto the Breach”: The Systemic Failure of Applying the European Convention on
Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT ’L L. 437 (1998); Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra
note 13, at 32.
46
See Inter-State Wars, supra note 45, at 143, 148, 149; Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 27, 33.
Yet, the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion regarding Israel’s security barrier,
interestingly considered that generally “the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease
in case of armed conflict . . . .” Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, supra note 9, sec. 106.
47
See Inter-State Wars, supra note 45, at 143, 148, 149, 152, 153; Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13,
at 33.
48
See, e.g., Inter-State Wars, supra note 45, at 139.
49
See Draper, supra note 27, at 148; Dale Stephens, Human Rights and Armed Conflict – The Advisory
41
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confuse international humanitarian law with human rights,”50 writes Dinstein. Although
the protection of the individual is paramount both in the regime of human rights law as
well as in the humanitarian law regime, there are, as Christopher Greenwood explains,
nonetheless
important differences between them. Human rights law is designed to
operate primarily in normal peacetime conditions, and within the
framework of the lega l relationship between a state and its citizens.
International humanitarian law, by contrast, is chiefly concerned with the
abnormal conditions of armed conflict and the relationship between a state
and the citizens of its adversary, a relationship otherwise based upon
power rather than law. 51
¶16

International humanitarian law, explains Robert Kolb, in fact “does not apply to the
relations of a State with its own nationals. Its sole objectives are to govern relations
between a belligerent and enemy civilians who, as a result of the occupation of the
territory of the State of which they are nationals, are under the control of the adverse
power.”52 Thus, summarizes Greenwood, “[i]nternational humanitarian law sets certain
bounds to the use of force against an adversary;” it “sets limits to the way in which force
may be used” and “determines . . . the relationship of the parties to a conflict with one
another.”53
¶17
Since international human rights law and international humanitarian law have
historically provided different answers to similar questions, it is not possible to apply
both regimes simultaneously. 54 Therefore the only applicable regime which balances
humanitarian needs with warfare’s innate nature, including the unique issues arising in
the course of belligerent occupation, is that of international humanitarian law. 55 The
separate and distinct historical foundations of each of the two regimes as well as their
respective applicable scope make clear that they cannot function simultaneously, side by
side. International humanitarian law is inherently a law that is meant to function between
States during wartime, 56 always mindful of military considerations, 57 and concerns the
manner in which a party in conflict is to conduct itself vis-à-vis protected persons. 58 “As
this law is still largely rooted in its traditional origins,” write Doswald-Beck and Vite, “it
is not alien to military thinking and has the advantage of being a realistic code for
military behaviour as well as protecting human rights to the maximum degree possible in
Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
1, 8, 9 (2001) [hereinafter Human Rights and Armed Conflict].
50
Inter-State Wars, supra note 45, at 147.
51
Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN A RMED CONFLICTS 1, 9 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
52
Kolb, supra note 22, at 418.
53
Greenwood, supra note 51, at 10.
54
See Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 28.
55
See id.; Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minis ter et al.,
supra note 14, para. 497.
56
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 497.
57
See Doswald-Beck & Vite, supra note 37; Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 30.
58
See Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 30.
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the circumstances.”59 This regime is thus more suitable for dealing with the complex
humanitarian issues arising out of situations of armed conflict and belligerent
occupation. 60 The regime of human rights, on the other hand, is meant to function during
peace.61 Peace, proclaimed the International Conference on Human Rights held in
Teheran, is “indispensable to the full realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.”62 “[P]eace is the underlying condition for the full observance of human rights
and war is their negation,” declared the International Conference. 63 Thus to
concomitantly apply two incompatible regimes would be inappropriate. 64 Clearly, then,
the two regimes are mutually exclusive, 65 and the applicable law is international
humanitarian law. 66
¶18
Most human rights that exist during peace are consequently in temporary
suspension during war. At the same time, disparate and special human rights, stemming
from the extraordinary circumstances surrounding war, are created as the result of war
and operate in place of those suspended. 67 The consequent effect of this unique situation
created by war is that civilians, even those in occupied areas, may lawfully have their
liberty circumscribed and their property seized, and they may however regrettably even
legitimately get killed. 68 “In the abnormal situation of war, an extraordinary legal
structure is called for,” explains Dinstein. 69 “It is not enough to prescribe legal norms,”
he points out. “[T]he norms have to manifest themselves in the actual practice of States,”
which of course is the natural method by which the laws of war, as all international law,
are created. 70 Thus, since States typically have been more interested in achieving a
successful outcome in war than worried about the human costs, it would be a risky
venture at best for the law to venture too far afield from reality, and might thereby prove
deleterious for the law itself. 71 In fact, given that international humanitarian law
developed in light of military considerations, from a purely practical standpoint there is
actually a greater likelihood of compliance with it thereby ensuring more of a chance that
human beings will actually be better protected during armed conflict situations than
would happen under a regime of vague human rights which in any respect generally
allow for derogation from their applicability during times of national emergencies. 72
“Unlike human rights law,” point out Doswald-Beck and Vite, “there is no concept of

59

Doswald-Beck & Vite, supra note 37, at 119.
See Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 33.
61
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 497.
62
U.N. Conference on Human Rights, Apr. 22-May 13, 1968, Proclamation of Teheran, Preamble, U.N.
Doc A/CONF.32/41.
63
Id., Resolution XXIII (Human Rights in Armed Conflicts).
64
See Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 33.
65
See Draper, supra note 27, at 148, 149; Armed Conflict, supra note 29, at 346, 350-51; Inter-State
Wars, supra note 45, at 147, 148, 149; see Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 26, 27, 28.
66
See Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 13, at 33.
67
See Inter-State Wars, supra note 45, at 148.
68
See id. at 149.
69
Id. at 151.
70
Id. at 152.
71
See id. at 152, 153.
72
See id. at 143, 148, 152, 153; Doswald-Beck & Vite, supra note 37, at 100-01, 119; Ben-Naftali &
Shany, supra note 13, at 31, 33.
60
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derogation in humanitarian law. Derogation in human rights law is allowed in most
general treaties in times of war or other emergency threatening the life of the nation.
Humanitarian law is made precisely for those situations, and the rules are fashioned in a
manner that will not undermine the ability of the army in question to win the war.”73 For
instance, the exercise of regular human rights during times of peace may be subject to
limitations “in time of public emergency,”74 as well as “in the interests of national
security or public safety, public order . . . the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others,”75 or “[i]n time of war or other public
emergency threatening the life of the nation.”76
¶19
The laws of war thus strive to maintain an appropriate balance between humanity
and military necessity within a framework “where to a large extent human rights are in
abeyance, leaving individuals to rely solely on the protection offered by international
humanitarian law.”77 The regime of humanitarian law and the regime of human rights
law are as diametrically opposed to each other as they are distinct from each other. 78
“[T]he law of human rights seeks to reflect the cohesion and harmony in human society
and must, from the nature of things, be a different and opposed law to that which seeks to
regulate the conduct of hostile relationships between States or other organized armed
groups,”79 elucidates Draper. After all, “[i]t is the law of armed conflict which is designed
to mitigate, as far as possible, the ‘evils of war.’ It is therefore difficult to support a
conclusion that the core values of human rights law now create a human rights nexus
between combatants engaged in military operations.”80
¶20
In this regard, too, Georg Schwarzenberger writes of “the dilectic interplay . . . of
the necessities of war and the standard of civilization” and “assessing the balance actually
attained between them . . . .”81 Clearly, “[i]nternational humanitarian law in armed
conflicts is a compromise between military and humanitarian requirements,” explains
Greenwood. “Its rules comply with both military necessity and the dictates of
humanity.”82 To artificially force the regime of international human rights to meld with
the regime of the law of armed conflict would militate against the practical advantages of
keeping these two regimes separate and would ignore the reasons behind the historical
differences between them. 83
73

Doswald-Beck & Vite, supra note 37, at 100-01; see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL A RMED CONFLICT 22 (2004) [hereinafter CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES].
74
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 33, art. 4(1).
75
Id., art. 22(2).
76
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms , supra note 34, art. 15.
77
Judith G. Gardam, Women, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 324 INT ’L REV. RED
CROSS 421, 421-22 (1998).
78
See Draper, supra note 27, at 149; Human Rights and Armed Conflict, supra note 49, at 8-9; Dale
Stephens, Rules of Engagement and the Concept of Unit Self Defense, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 126, 146 (1998)
[hereinafter Rules of Engagement].
79
Draper, supra note 27, at 149; Rules of Engagement, supra note 78, at 146; Human Rights and Armed
Conflict, supra note 49, at 8-9.
80
Rules of Engagement, supra note 78, at 146; Human Rights and Armed Conflict, supra note 49, at 89.
81
GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, II INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS, THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICTS 244 (1968).
82
Greenwood, supra note 51, at 32.
83
See Human Rights and Armed Conflict, supra note 49, at 8.
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“[I]t is not the function of the international law of war,” observes Ernst H.

Feilchenfeld, “to oblige belligerents to create wartime paradises which nobody is under
an obligation to establish even in peacetime.”84 After all, “[u]nder international law
peace is regarded as the normal, and war as the abnormal, situation. Where protection is
afforded through rules on warfare, it is their purpose to prevent normal treatment from
falling below a certain level of abnormalcy,”85 he explains.
¶22
Specifically concerning military occupation, a military government is not identical
to a government in a democracy. The purpose of a military occupation is not the welfare
of the local inhabitants of the occupied area. During the occupation, the occupying
power may suspend most human rights that might be applicable during peace. Yet, the
occupying power’s authority is not boundless; there are limitations intended to grant the
inhabitants “a minimal protection of life, liberty and property, and of a few fundamental
freedoms not related to the state of war.”86 However, even though “[a]n occupying power
is responsible for respecting the fundamental human rights of the population under its
authority,” it is at the same time recognized that “an occupying power may take such
measures of control and security as may be necessary as a result of the war.”87
¶23
It must be understood, explains Ernst Fraenkel, that
an occupation government, even if it is conducted under the rule of law, is
basically different from the government of a constitutional state. In the
latter, the bearers of power are the representatives of those who are subject
to that power, and the stability of the whole system demands that there be
some degree of mutual trust, each in the other . . . . An occupation regime,
however, is the rule of a foreign government which does not even pretend
to represent the will of the governed population. No ethnic ties, no shared
traditions, no voluntary act of political confidence unite the rulers and
their subjects. Indeed, each mistrusts the other. Under these conditions,
limitations of power which derive from the people’s participation in the
government . . . are out of the question. 88
¶24

Fraenkel continues, pointing out that
the problem of supremacy of law under the peculiar conditions of an
occupation regime cannot be solved merely by reference to general
considerations of justice and democracy. The rule of law in a democratic
state is based on the consent of the citizens. In an occupied territory,
public power is enforced upon the residents regardless of their inner
feelings. Therefore the concept of ‘rule of law’ has different meanings in

84

ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD , THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 18
(1942).
85
Id.
86
Belligerent Occupation , supra note 29, at 116-17.
87
Hearts and Minds, supra note 8.
88
ERNST FRAENKEL , M ILITARY OCCUPATION AND THE RULE OF LAW , OCCUPATION GOVERNMENT IN
THE RHINELAND , 1918-23, at 204-05 (1944).
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a government based on democratic consent and a government based on
military force. 89
Furthermore, instructs Feilchenfeld, one should not “impose a higher standard on
wartime occupants than on peacetime sovereigns . . . .”90
¶25
Thus, for human rights to be more effectively protected during war, the more
inclusive and better coverage designed for the unique situation of wartime is afforded by
the humanitarian law specifically adapted for war. 91 After all, the special constraints and
practicalities of warfare and combat situatio ns have been accepted by States and have
been taken into account in the framework of the laws of war, 92 which as irony would have
it, is as a matter of fact, “one of the oldest and most venerable branches of international
human rights law . . . which is itself a highly organized and systematic campaign of
human rights deprivation.”93 In other words, war is naturally the ultimate negation of
human rights and the total absence of humanity, viewed by the human rights systems in a
disparaging fashion as a temporary anomaly. 94 There is therefore no common ground
between the two regimes. 95 The laws of war are as a result “a derogation from the normal
regime of human rights . . . .”96 Certainly humanitarian principles currently abound, yet
basically speaking the goals of human rights laws are not the same as those of the laws of
war. 97 Thus, writes Draper, “[t]he attempt to confuse the [regimes of international
humanitarian law and human rights law] is insupportable in theory and inadequate in
practice. The two regimes are not only distinct but are diametrically opposed.”98
¶26
Despite the appearance of the word “human” in the context of the expression
“international humanitarian law,” it remains
essential to resist any temptation to regard them as intertwined or
interchangeable. The adjective “human” in the phrase “human rights”
points at the subject in whom the rights are vested: human rights are
conferred on human beings as such (without the interposition of States).
In contrast, the adjective “humanitarian” in the term “International
Humanitarian Law” merely indicates the considerations that may have
steered those responsible for the formation and formulation of the legal
norms. 99

89

Id. at 226-27.
FEILCHENFELD, supra note 84, at 18-19.
91
See Human Rights and Armed Conflict, supra note 49, at 8; Inter-State Wars, supra note 45, at 151;
Armed Conflict, supra note 29, at 355.
92
See Human Rights and Armed Conflict, supra note 49, at 8.
93
RICHARD B. LILLICH & FRANK C. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND POLICY 670 (1979).
94
See G.I.A.D. Draper, The Relationship Between the Human Rights Regime and the Law of Armed
Conflicts, 1 I SR . Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 191, 196 (1971) [hereinafter Relationship Between].
95
See Human Rights and Armed Conflict, supra note 49, at 10.
96
Relationship Between, supra note 94, at 206.
97
See Human Rights and Armed Conflict, supra note 49, at 10.
98
Draper, supra note 27, at 149.
99
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 73, at 20.
90
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International humanitarian law, or the law of international armed conflict, “is the law
channeling conduct in international armed conflict, with a view to mitigating human
suffering.”100
¶27
One possible way, though, that the humanitarian law regime of belligerent
occupation might be reconciled with the human rights regime is elucidated by Jochen
Abr. Frowein: “For situations in which humanitarian law gives a special justification for
an interference with individual rights, this must also be accepted as justification for
interference with rights protected according to human rights treaties,” in the sense that
“specific rules take precedence as lex specialis whenever they have a specific justification
for dealing with specific problems. That will mean that in many areas humanitarian
treaties will take precedence.”101 In other words, “international humanitarian law takes
precedence over human rights treaties as lex specialis in so far as it may constitute a
special justification in armed conflicts for interference with rights protected under human
rights treaties . . . .”102 Consequently, when considering the Fourth Geneva Convention,
for instance, “[i]n cases of belligerent occupation . . . the specific rules of the . . .
Convention take precedence” over obligations arising under applicable human rights
conventions “regarding specific measures which are justified on the basis of these
provisions.”103
III. NO PERCEIVED NEED FOR SECURITY BARRIER
¶28

Between 1993 and 2000, the Palestinians and Israelis had been engaged in
negotiations aimed at settling their decades- long dispute in a peaceful manner. Israel was
dedicated to making the Palestinians into prosperous neighbors as well as into economic
partners through intertwined and wide-ranging economic interaction. 104 Cooperation
between Palestinians and Israelis abounded in areas such as health, police, security,
agriculture, rescue services, fire control, pollution, and universities. Israel and the
Palestinians were determined to improve the socioeconomic status of the entire region,
and both perceived the enhancement of their bi- lateral economic relations as critical to
the success of the peace process. 105 On a social level, personal friendships burgeoned
between Israelis and Palestinians as the latter frequented Israeli malls, cities, restaurants,
and social and athletic events. Perhaps most importantly, none of the successive prime
ministers of Israel so much as contemplated taking on the enormous expense of building
a security barrier as a means against infiltrating terrorists from the West Bank. Simply
put, there was no need or justification for such a mammoth, expensive project as a
100

Id.
Jochen Abr. Frowein, The Relationship between Human Rights Regimes and Regimes of Belligerent
Occupation, 28 I SR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 1, 9 (1998).
102
Id. at 16.
103
Id. at 11.
104
See Interim, supra note 15, Annex V; see also, e.g., Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic
Relations Between Israel and the Palestinian Authority—Update May 1998 (July 13, 1998),
http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH01vn0 (last visited Nov. 18, 2005); Palestinian Workers in
Israel—Facts and Figures, HA’A RETZ, Aug. 30, 1999, at 6A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Amos Harel,
The Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, HA’A RETZ, Sept. 13, 2000, at 2A (in Hebrew, on file
with author).
105
See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations: August 1998 (Nov.
22, 1998), http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH07sc0 (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
101
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security barrier, which turned into one of the biggest and most costly construction
projects in the history of the State of Israel. 106
¶29
Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestinian National Authority, was then offered in 2000
a deal during peace negotia tions with the Israelis to finally end the conflict between the
Palestinians and Israel, a deal, according to Ambassador Dennis Ross, in charge of
Middle East peace process negotiations for the first President Bush and President Clinton,
that would have given the Palestinians a State “with territory in over 97 percent of the
West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem,”107 with the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem as
its capital, and with the unlimited right of return to it for Palestinian refugees. 108
¶30
Arafat’s response to this generous offer was, regrettably, to exchange war for
negotiations, thereby denying the Palestinian people an opportunity for peace, dignity,
and prosperity while instigating and stimulating them to become living bombs. 109 Israel
came under siege. Starting in September 2000, Israel and Israelis were subjected to an
intensive terrorist offensive, and for the last five years were the object of massive,
ruthless, and extensive terror attack. Tens of thousands of terrorist attacks were
conducted against Israelis over the past five years, 110 ranging from isolated shootings to
rocket, missile, and mortar attacks on Israeli cities, towns, and villages, in addition to
thousands of shooting incidents. 111 Terrorists perpetrated close to 1000 of these strikes in
Israel within the pre-1967 “Green Line,”112 and caused more than 8590 casualties. 113 Of
106
See John Ward Anderson, Israel’s Fence Mixes Security and Politics, W ASH. POST , Sept. 23, 2003, at
A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A49363-2003Sep22?language=printer. The
total cost of the security barrier is estimated to reach approximately US $1.3 billion, which comes out to
over US $3.8 million a mile for its planned 350-mile length. See Amnon Brazili and Moti Basuk, The Cost
of the Required Changes in the Route of the Separation Fence Due to the Decision of the High Court of
Justice – 80-100 Million Shekels, HA’A RETZ, Jan. 7, 2005, at 3A (in Hebrew, on file with author).
Alterations in the route of the barrier have resulted in an outlay of some US $23 million just as a result of
the Israel High Court of Justice decision in Beit Sourik Village Council [HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village
Council v. The Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC (Barak, C.J.), available at
http://62.90.71.124/files_eng/04/560/020/a28/04020560.a28.htm (last visited July 2, 2005)]. See Brazili and
Basuk, The Cost of the Required Changes, supra.
107
Dennis B. Ross, Think Again: Yasir Arafat, FOREIGN POL’Y, July-Aug. 2002, available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=179&page=0.
108
See id.
109
See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Reasons Behind the Fence: Palestinian Terror Assault,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45212&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 [hereinafter Terror Assault] (last visited Nov. 19, 2005).
110
See Israel Defense Forces, Total of Attacks in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Home Front Since
September 2000 (July 24, 2004), http://www1.idf.il/SIP_STORAGE/DOVER/files/9/21829.doc
[hereinafter Total of Attacks] (last visited Nov. 18, 2005). Through July 2004, over 22,400 terrorist attacks
were perpetrated. See id.
111
See, e.g., Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et
al., supra note 14, para. 56.
112
See Total of Attacks, supra note 110. Through July 2004, some 889 terrorist attacks were executed
within pre-1967 “Green Line” Israel. Id.
113
See Israeli Defense Forces, Casualties Since 29.09.2000 (updated Nov. 1, 2005),
http://www1.idf.il/SIP_STORAGE/DOVER/files/7/21827.doc (last visited Nov. 18, 2005) [hereinafter
Casualties Since 29.09.2000]. In the United States, this would be the proportional equivalent to almost a
third of a million casualties and the equivalent of over 40,000 murdered. The total number killed in the
suicide terrorist hijackings of September 11, 2001 was around 3,000 people. See Sara Kugler, Official
WTC Death Toll Near 2,830, A SSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 26, 2002, available at
http://www.geocities.com/nyfdus/oldnames.html (last visited July 2, 2005). This means that Israel has
suffered—in terms of its proportion of terrorist victims over the past five years—the equivalent of almost
104 “September 11ths.” Palestinian terrorism has in fact claimed more than 135 U.S. casualties since the
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the total number of people killed by terrorist attacks from September 2000, over 750 of
them—the vast majority—were civilians, just as the vast majority of those injured, more
than 5250 people, were also civilians. 114
¶31
Typically many suicide terrorists stroll over to Israeli cities and villages, often
located just minutes away on foot from Palestinian-controlled areas, 115 quickly finding
themselves in the midst of throngs of Israelis. The terrorists’ mission of inflicting
indiscriminate death is made easier by the proximity of women, children, and elderly
people going about their daily lives—shopping in malls, eating in restaurants, drinking in
pubs, lined up waiting to enter a discotheque, traveling on buses, 116 celebrating religious
ceremonies and holidays, and the like. It is only a fifteen- minute walk from the
Palestinian city of Qalqilya to the Israeli city of Kfar Saba, where five people have been
murdered in four recent terrorist attacks; it is also a fifteen- minute walk from Palestiniancontrolled territory to the Israeli kibbutz Metzer, where terrorists murdered six people in
two attacks; it is a thirty- minute walk from Palestinian-controlled territory to the
Megiddo Junction in Israel, where terrorists killed seventeen people in a terrorist attack;
and it is a sixty- minute walk from Palestinian-controlled territory to the Israeli city of
Afula, where terrorists murdered twenty-six people in five terrorist attacks.
¶32
The terrorist campaign waged against Israel and Israelis beginning in 2000 is often,
and mistakenly, referred to as the second “Intifada.”117 “Intifada suggests a popular
uprising,” explains Danny Ayalon, Israel’s Ambassador to the United States. “[I]t’s not a
popular uprising—it was a very well-orchestrated . . . . coalition of terror where you see
the [Palestinian Authority] cooperating with Hamas, Tanzim, PFLP, [Islamic] Jihad—all
of them working together against all the commitments and agreements.”118 Far from
being a “popular uprising,”119 the wave of terrorism committed against Israel and Israelis
is in fact a “crime against humanity.” According to Human Rights Watch, “[t]he scale
and systematic nature of the [terrorist] attacks on [Israeli] civilians . . . meets the
definition of a crime against humanity.”120 So, too, Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the

“renunciation” of violence by the Palestinians in the September 1993 Oslo Peace Agreement [Declaration
of Principles, supra note 15], and of these, fifty-three were murdered by Palestinian terrorists. American
Victims of Mideast Terrorist Attacks, Jewish Virtual Library,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/usvictims.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
114
See Casualties Since 29.09.2000, supra note 113.
115
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 53; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Reasons Behind the Fence: Geography,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45210&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005); Miki Arbel, Fence is a Defensive
Measure,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?DocumentID=45845&MissionID=45187 (last
visited Nov. 19, 2005).
116
See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affa irs, The Reasons Behind the Fence: First Priority—Saving Lives,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45219&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005) [hereinafter First Priority].
117
See, e.g., Yaakov Amidror, Israel’s Security: The Hard-Learned Lessons, M IDDLE E. Q., Winter
2004, at 30-44, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=384 (last visited
July 2, 2005).
118
Cited in Paula Amann, Olive branch and shield, THE WASH. JEWISH W K, Sept. 17, 2002, available at
http://www.juf.org/news_public_affairs/article.asp?key=3552 (last visited July 2, 2005).
119
See, e.g., Amidror, supra note 117.
120
Human Rights Watch, Erased In A Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians (Oct.
2002) (emphasis added), http://hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002-04.htm#P586_122723.
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International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, classifies murder, as well as “[o]ther
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health” as “crimes against humanity” when they
are “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack.”121 Moreover, to the extent that Palestinians
could be considered to be engaged in an international armed conflict against Israel and
Israelis, the following acts perpetrated by terrorists also could be classified as war crimes:
Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or
against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities;
Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects
which are not military objectives;
...
Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army;
...
Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render
certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations. 122
¶33

Had the Palestinian leadership under Arafat demonstrated fidelity to the peace
process instead of initiating and perpetuating violence and incitement, there would be no
security barrier today. 123 There would have been no need for one. 124 As a response to
violence run amok, 125 and only in this environment, the security barrier has been
embraced by Israelis virtually across the political spectrum as a necessary means to
diminish terrorism. Significantly, Israeli experience in the Gaza Strip, which has had a
security barrier separating it from Israel for years, has shown that terrorism drops
dramatically where there is a security barrier. Even the portions of barrier built so far in
the West Bank, as well as the fence along the Lebanese border, have proven their
efficacy. 126 For instance, a comparison of the year preceding the construction of the
121
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available
at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
122
Id., art. 8; also cited in U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT
432-433, para. 16.34 (2004).
123
See Terror Assault, supra note 109.
124
See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Reasons Behind the Fence: A Last Resort,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45216&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005); Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
The Reasons Behind the Fence: Protecting the Peace Process,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45214&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005).
125
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, paras. 51, 57.
126
See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Concept and Guidelines: A Proven Effectiveness,
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barrier with the year following construction demonstrates a decrease by 91 percent in the
number of those injured in terrorist attacks and a drop of 84 percent in the number of
those killed. 127 Simply put, the security barrier is a non-violent, reversible form of defense
that quickly and effectively reduces terrorism. 128
IV. DETERMINING THE BARRIER’S ROUTE
¶34

Israel realizes that the determination of any permanent border can be accomplished
only through direct negotiations with the Palestinians. 129 In the meantime, the security
barrier annexes no territory to Israel, 130 nor does it in any way affect the ownership of
private Palestinian lands or any Palestinian’s legal status. 131 Israel strives to erect the
fence on public land, but in instances in which this is not feasible, and private land is as a
result requisitioned, compensation is proffered for its use. 132 Furthermore, barren land is
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=46063&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) and
http://www.hanoar.co.uk/israelupdate2.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Proven Effectiveness].
127
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 77. Reports quantifying by a particular percentage the rate of success in prevention of
terrorist attacks will naturally differ, depending on the source and when the specific statistics were
compiled, as well as on which—and how many—factors are taken into account. Some reports have
demonstrated a very high success rate—90%—in preventing attacks in specific areas. See, e.g.,
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Center for Special Studies, Anti-Terrorist Fence Cuts
Samaria-Based Attacks by 90 Percent (July 5, 2004),
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/c_t/fence/images/july_6_04.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2005); Tekla
Szymanski, Israel’s Security Fence: Back to the Wall? (2004), http://www.teklaszymanski.com/engl8fence.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2005). Others indicate an 80% decrease in attacks
perpetrated by terrorists in Israel. See Laura King, Israel’s High Court Puts a Dent in West Bank Barrier,
L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at A1. Ra’anan Gissin, a senior advisor to Prime Minister Sharon, was quoted as
saying that the barrier has resulted in a reduction in terrorist attacks by 70%. See Israeli High Court:
Redraw Part of Barrier, CNN.COM, June 30, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/30/israel.barrier/ [hereinafter Redraw Part of Barrier]. There
are also other reports that point to a reduction of suicide terrorist attacks by 50%. See Matthew Gutman,
Analysis: Fence Has Momentum of its Own, THE JERUSALEM POST , Jan. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1074485522129&p=100
6688055060 (last visited June 17, 2005) and
http://www.acj.org/Daily%20News/2004/January/Jan_20.htm#11 (last visited Nov 19, 2005). According to
others, the barrier has brought about a 30% decrease in suicide bombings. See Hardtalk (BBC television
interview with Daniel Taub, Director of the Israel Foreign Ministry General Law Department, Feb. 5,
2004), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/3466987. Yet, whatever the source
relied upon, it is clear that the fence is indeed performing its function of reducing terrorist attacks. The
security barrier in fact has proven itself to be the most effective obstacle that Israel has put up between
terrorism and its citizens within the Green Line. See Amos Harel, Fear: The Terrorists will Learn from Car
Thieves to Circumvent the Fence, HA’A RETZ, Jan. 17, 2005 at 1A, (in Hebrew, on file with author).
128
See Proven Effectiveness, supra note 126; see also Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ
4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al., supra note 14, paras. 79, 80, 81, 82.
129
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 52.
130
See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Concept and Guidelines: A Line of Defense—Not a Border,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45392&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last vis ited Nov. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Not a Border]; Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Legal Aspects: Overview,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45665&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Legal Aspects].
131
See Not a Border, supra note 130; Legal Aspects, supra, note 130.
132
See Beit Sourik Village Council, supra note 106; HCJ 8172, 8532/02 Ibrahim v. Commander of IDF
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preferred to agricultural land and unproductive land to productive land. 133 Additionally,
Israel takes into account the effect that the fence will have on the daily lives of the
Palestinian residents of the area as a major factor influencing the routing of the fence. 134
The maintenance of daily life along the barrier has several facets: (1) the assurance of
access to agricultural lands located on the other side of the barrier; (2) access to
employment, health care, municipal services, education, shopping, and family; and (3)
maintenance of commerce. Serious consideration consequently is given to aspects of
daily life such as the location of agricultural fields, familial connections, municipal
planning boundaries, commercial and educational ties, as well as access to health care
and other municipal services. 135 Where possible, the route of the fence is adjusted
according to these concerns in order to prevent the disruption of daily life. 136 In cases
where such route adjustments are impossible, local solutions for daily life issues are
adopted. Every effort is thus made to minimize the effect of the fence on the daily lives of
the Palestinian popula tion. 137
¶35
The procedure for seizure of property in the erection of the fence contains
significant, built- in protections, including administrative remedies before the property is
seized, 138 such as notification, an objections process, and petitioning the Israel High Court
of Justice. Notification to property owners regarding an intended seizure takes place in a
number of ways: direct notification by delivery of the seizure order to the property owner
by way of the Palestinian liaison offices, copies of the seizure notice and an invitation to
a “walkthrough” of the planned route are posted on the bulletin board in the offices of the
Civil Administration, and invitations to the walkthrough are also scattered around the

Forces in the West Bank [2002], (Beinish, J.) IsrSC (in Hebrew), available at
http://62.90.71.124/files/02/720/081/n05/02081720.n05.HTM (last visited Mar. 6, 2005); Israel’s Response
in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al., supra note 14, paras. 70, 73;
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Concept and Guidelines: A Temporary Measure,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45221&MissionID
=45187&LanguageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005) [hereinafter A
Temporary Measure]; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Humanitarian Aspects: Impact on Palestinians,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45227&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Impact on Palestinians].
133
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 70.
134
See id., paras. 63, 68, 69, 70, 73.
135
See, e.g., Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 11344/03 Salim v. Commander of IDF
Forces in the West Bank [2005] IsrSC (in Hebrew), available at http://www.acri.org.il/hebrewacri/engine/story.as p?id=813 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005).
136
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 69; Israeli Defence Forces, IDF Fact Sheet: The Procedure for the Erection of the
Security Fence in the Seam Zone (2004) (in Hebrew, on file with author) [hereinafter IDF Fact Sheet]; A
Temporary Measure, supra note 132; Impact on Palestinians, supra note 132; Beit Sourik Village Council,
supra note 106; Aluf Benn et al., Sharon Orders Illegal Sections of Fence Rerouted, HA’A RETZ, July 2,
2004, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/446433.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005); Aluf Benn & Arnon
Regular, Sharon: Re-Examine All the Route of the Fence in Accordance with the High Court of Justice,
HA’A RETZ, July 2, 2004, at 1A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Israel’s Response in the Matter
Concerning HCJ 11344/03 Salim v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, supra note 135.
137
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, paras. 63, 68. 69, 70; IDF Fact Sheet, supra note 136; see also A Temporary Measure, supra
note 132; Imp act on Palestinians, supra note 132.
138
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 71.
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property that is planned for seizure. When possible, the heads of the villages affected as
well as the village engineers are notified. 139
After the publication of the seizure notice, and on the date indicated in the
invitation, the walkthrough of the planned route is held. The purpose of the walkthrough
is to clarify the exact planned route and to enable any property owner to ascertain the
extent of damage, if any, expected to his property. Hundreds of property owners have
participated in these walkthroughs. 140
Property owners affected by the planned route are notified that they have a week
from the walkthrough to object to the seizure of their property. There are no formal
requirements for the format of the objections, nor is any cost attached to filing them. The
objecting property owner need not have legal representation, though he may if he so
chooses, and most have indeed chosen to be represented by legal counsel. Often, owners
initially request an extension of the period for filing the objection. These requests are
routinely granted. Numerous local route changes have been effected through the
objections process. These changes are primarily designed to ensure that local life along
the fence can be maintained. 141
Moreover, once the route of the fence is established, a further examination is
undertaken to determine the uses of the land and other material links for the area between
the fence and the Armistice Line (that is, within an area called the Seam Zone). If
residents of areas on the eastern side of the fence cultivate land within the Seam Zone or
if other specific interests link residents to the Seam Zone, arrangements are made to
enable the continued cultivation or links to continue. 142
Should the process of objections not yield the desired result for the owners of
property affected by the fence, they may file an objection to the land requisitions with the
Supreme Court of Israel sitting as the High Court of Justice. 143 In fact, when the High
Court is petitioned for this purpose, the work on the relevant portion of the barrier is
postponed to enable the petitioner to proceed with his claim. 144 Dozens of such petitions
have been filed. 145 In the framework of both the objection process and court proceedings
numerous changes in the route of the barrier have been decided upon and other actions
have been taken that were designed to improve the daily life along the barrier. 146
Moreover, decisions of the High Court have annulled army seizure orders in cases in
which it has determined that not enough account was taken of the disruption caused to the
daily of life of the Palestinians, and ordered the alteration of the route of the barrier. In
June 2004, for instance, the Israel High Court of Justice upheld a Palestinian petition and

139

See IDF Fact Sheet, supra note 136.
See id.
141
See id.
142
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 11344/03 Salim v. Commander of IDF Forces
in the West Bank, supra note 135.
143
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 71; IDF Fact Sheet, supra note 136; see also Impact on Palestinians, supra note 132;
Dan Izenberg, IDF Stunned as Court Keeps Fence in Limbo, THE JERUSALEM POST , Jan. 28, 2005, at 3.
144
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 71; see also IDF stunned as court keeps fence in limbo, supra note 143.
145
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, paras. 71, 73.
146
See id. para. 72.
140
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indeed annulled several army land seizure orders. 147 The High Court ruling determined
that the security advantages arising from the planned route of a section of the barrier near
Jerusalem were not proportional to the disruption caused to Palestinian daily life in that
area, and that the route must be altered in some places and re-examined in others to take
into account the proper balance between security and humanitarian considerations. 148 In
compliance, Israel Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered the Ministry of Justice and the
defense establishment to find a less disruptive route for the barrier. 149 Accordingly, after
months of reassessment and deliberations, the defense establishment presented Prime
Minister Sharon and Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz with a new route for the security
barrier that diminished by roughly sixty percent the area encompassed by the barrier’s
original route. 150
¶40
In actuality, most West Bank Palestinians reside east of the security barrier, and
very few villages are located to its west. 151 Although the barrier does restrict some
movement (its purpose, after all, is to save Israeli lives by keeping out terrorists 152 ), Israel
strives to minimize the inconvenience by permitting people and commodities to pass
through the many gates placed into the barrier153 for the use of both Palestinians as well
as for Israelis. 154
147

See Beit Sourik Village Council, supra note 106. Nevertheless, the Israel High Court also held in the
same ruling that since the barrier is not being erected for political reasons, there is no prohibition on
continuing its construction. Id.
148
See id.; Ilil Shahar, Sharon Orders New Barrier Route in Accordance with Court Decision,
M A’A RIV, July 3, 2004, http://www.maarivintl.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=article&articleID=9298. In a
similar fashion, the Israel High Court of Justice on September 15, 2005 unanimously ruled that for a section
of the barrier in the region of the Alfei Menashe settlement in the northern part of the West Bank the Israel
government “must reconsider the existing route” and “within a reasonable period, reconsider the various
alternatives for the separation fence route . . ., while examining security alternatives which injure the fabric
of life of the residents of the villages of the enclave to a lesser extent.” HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe and Others
v. The Prime Minister of Israel and Others [2005] (Barak, C.J.), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html (visited Nov. 3, 2005).
149
See Benn & Regular, supra note 136; Israel’s Aim Is Self-Defense, Not Hurting Palestinians,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, July 8, 2004, at 39, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1167723/posts . As a consequence of the Beit Sourik Village Council [Beit Sourik Village Council,
supra note 106] ruling of the Israel High Court of Justice, the Ministry of Justice undertook a detailed
examination of each and every mile of the entire route of the barrier in order to evaluate it in light of the
new standards set by the High Court. See Yuval Yoaz, Between Hague and the Disengagement, the Adviser
Tries to End Putting the Head in Sand in Relation to International Law, HA’A RETZ, Jan. 5, 2005, at 5A (in
Hebrew, on file with author). In parallel, the defense establishment decided that as a result of the ruling of
the High Court the adjusted route of the barrier would be situated as close as possible to the Green Line.
Moreover, the defense establishment’s decision to re-assess the barrier’s route related to the entire route
and was not limited solely to the eighteen miles of barrier that the High Court had in its judgment
considered problematic, nor did the decision of the defense establishment differentiate between parts of the
barrier that already had been constructed or were in the process of being constructed, and other parts of the
barrier that were still in the planning stage. See Yuval Yoaz and Arnon Regular, In the Security
Establishment It Was Decided: the Entire Length of the Fence will Abut the Green Line as Much as
Possible, HA’A RETZ, July 14, 2004, at 5A (in Hebrew, on file with author).
150
See Amnon Brazili, The New Route of the Fence Will Annex to Israel 400 Thousand Dunams of the
Bank Area, HA’A RETZ, Nov. 29, 2004, at 1A; see also Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ
4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al., supra note 14, paras. 87, 88, 89.
151
See Not a Border, supra note 130.
152
See, e.g., Yosef Goell, Pardon the Inconvenience, JERUSALEM POST , July 5, 2004, at 13.
153
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, paras. 70, 74; Impact on Palestinians, supra note 132.
154
See Impact on Palestinians, supra note 132.
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The potential of the fence to disrupt daily life along its route is taken into account
during its construction. The initial routing of the fence, in fact, is done in such a way as to
minimize potential hardships along the route. Solutions for anticipated problems are
sought and integrated into the initial planning of the route. 155 During the first phase of the
routing of the fence some mistakes were made, with several communities becoming
separated from their agricultural lands while some Pale stinian communities were
enclosed within the fence. Following the fence’s initial operation period, the Israel Civil
Administration performed a study of its effects on the ground. The implementation of its
recommendations began with the disma ntling of the fence initially erected east of Baqa
al-Sharqiya. 156 Other changes in the fence’s route accordingly have been carried out 157
while additional ones are designed. Furthermore, new roads also have been planned to
accommodate daily needs of the Palestinian residents of the area, as well as an
underground passageway between the Palestinian cities Hable and Qalqilya. In places
where the barrier caused delays in the arrival of schoolchildren to school, Israel initiated,
and funds, a busing program to ensure the arrival of pupils on time for their classes. 158
¶42
Of the approximately 130 miles which have been completed, 159 more than ninetyfive percent of Israel’s barrier is chain- link fence, while some segments of concrete wall,
consisting of about five percent of its length, 160 were placed along some inter-city

155

See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, paras. 63, 68. 69, 70, 73; Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 11344/03 Salim v.
Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, supra note 135.
156
See. Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 11344/03 Salim v. Commander of IDF Forces
in the West Bank, supra note 135; Isabel Kershner, The Fence Mender, JERUSALEM REPORT , Apr. 19,
2004, at 20.
157
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, paras. 69, 84, 85.
158
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 11344/03 Salim v. Commander of IDF Forces
in the West Bank, supra note 135; see also IDF Fact Sheet, supra note 136.
159
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, paras. 52, 54 (indicating that while some 133 miles of the barrier had been completed as of
January 2005, work was progressing on another 71 miles of barrier). Certainly different sources will
indicate different lengths of the barrier completed depending on the respective dates of the source, the
relevant information available at that time, and different ideas as to what constitutes completion of the
barrier. See, for instance, Szymanski, supra note 127, citing 197 miles completed as of January 2004,
while Ra’anan Gissin, senior advisor to Israel Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, is quoted as saying in June
2004 that 87 miles had been completed. See Redraw Part of Barrier, supra note 127.
160
See Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and Propriety, Request for an
Advisory Opinion from the 10th Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on
“the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel,” International Court
of Justice, Jan. 30, 2004, para. 2.7, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwpframe.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Written Statement on Jurisdiction and Propriety]. Reports of the
percentage amount of concrete in the barrier differ. Some sources place the concrete portion of the barrier
at around 3.8%. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Anti-Terrorist Fence—Facts and Figures
(2004), http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/Data/49058.pps, slide 14 (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). While as
of late March 2004, according to the Israel Foreign Ministry, “[l]ess than 3% of the fence will be
constructed of concrete” [Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Concept and Guidelines: A Fence, Not a Wall,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45874&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005)], Israel’s Response in the Matter
Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al., supra note 14, para. 49 cites 7.6% built of
concrete, which is still only about 10 miles. . Whatever the exact percentage will ultimately be once the
barrier is complete, it is clear that only a small portion of the barrier will consist of concrete. See Concept
and Guidelines: A Temporary Measure, supra note 132.
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highways to deter terrorist sniping at passing Israeli civilian vehicles161 as has been taking
place for years, and in some populated places to minimize the amount of land that must
be used to construct an antiterrorist barrier. 162
¶43
Although the barrier does restrict some Palestinians from going easily from one
place to another, the resulting inconvenience itself does not make the barrier illegal under
international humanitarian law. Even if the inconvenience affects those who neither
participated nor assisted in the perpetration of hostile actions, they nevertheless must
adjust themselves to the reality of measures that are taken due to military necessity. 163
Every time there is an armed conflict there will be people who will be inconvenienced or
even suffer profound losses. This is one of the lamentable aspects of war, a part of “the
stern realities of warfare,”164 “the harsh necessities of war,”165 that reflect “the harsh
realities of naked power in wartime.”166 It is unfortunately impossible to divorce the
horrendous consequences of war from the reality of its impact on civilian life in the
vicinity. Even “while observing the specific prescriptions of the Hague Regulations
against spoliation and appropriation,” for example, observes Julius Stone, an occupying
power can “still reduce the local people and territory to economic ruin.”167
¶44
The dreadful consequences of armed conflict were not lost on the drafters of the
Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land168 and the Fourth
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,169 yet
the architects of these international conventions nevertheless realized that military
necessity is, however problematic, a legitimate and essential consideration as well. As the
Fourth Hague Convention’s Preamble reveals, military necessity has been taken into
account in framing the regulations: “[T]he wording of [the Convention’s provisions] has
been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements

161

See, e.g., A Temporary Measure, supra note 132.
Typically, the ground area needed to construct concrete portions of the barrier in a populated vicinity
is about one-third of that needed to construct a barrier consisting of chain-link fence.
163
See HCJ 302/72 Hilu, et al v. The Government of Israel [1973], 27(2) IsrSC 169, 178 (Landau, J.) (in
Hebrew). As Justice Landau of the Israel Supreme Court opined, “[e]ven if the terrorist activity . . . has
diminished for now, it is not known if it might be re -ignited, and it is better to forestall this eventuality with
an ounce of prevention rather than a pound of cure and to complete the other security measures that have
been undertaken by totally isolating the area from uncontrolled infiltration from the outside.” Id. at 178;
see also HCJ 606, 610/78 Ayoub, et al v. Minister of Defence, et al [1979], 33(2) IsrSC 113, 130– 31
(Landau, J) (in Hebrew). Likewise, as the Israel High Court of Justice held in HCJ 258/79 Amira v. The
Minister of Defence, et al, 34(1) IsrSC 90 (Landau, acting C.J.) (in Hebrew), “appropriate military planning
must take into account not only existing dangers but also dangers that may be created as a result of dynamic
development in the territory.”
164
GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 227 (1957).
165
JEAN S. PICTET , COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF W AR 184 (1952).
166
JULIUS STONE , LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT : A TREATISE ON THE DYNAMICS OF
DISPUTES- AND W AR-LAW 726 (2d ed. 1959).
167
Id. at 729. As Ernst Fraenkel points out, for example, “[i]t certainly could not be said that the years
1920–22 were for Germany a period of peaceful development. On the contrary, it was then that the
German people first began to realize the full social and economic devastation of the war.” FRAENKEL,
supra note 88, at 111.
168
Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) [hereinafter Hague
Regulations], http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm.
169
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39.
162
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permit . . . .”170 It is thus only to state the obvious to say that military considerations must
play a crucial and vital role in any armed conflict situation.
V. ALONG THE “G REEN LINE”
¶45

Israel has emphasized time and time again that the security barrier is an interim,
temporary measure designed to confront the terror attack; 171 private property required for
the erection of the fence is seized under orders valid for only a limited period of time 172 in
the effort to impede the perpetration of deadly terrorist attacks against innocent Israelis. If
it is to achieve this purpose, the route of the barrier ought not take some arbitrary line
drawn in green color on a map for political reasons, 173 a line that even splits Arab villages
down the middle, 174 the armistice demarcation line (that is, in essence, the pre-1967
“Green Line”) from the 1949 General Armistice Agreement with Jordan, 175 as
determinative of what will accomplish this. Although the armistice demarcation line
reflected a contextual reality relevant at that time, it is hardly relevant to what is needed
today to impede and block terrorist infiltration being carried out against Israelis.
¶46
The Armistice Agreement itself in fact specifically dictates in Article II(2) that it
shall in no “way prejudice the rights, claims and positions” of Jordan or Israel “in the
ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of the Agreement
having been dictated exclusively by military considerations.”176 According to Article
VI(9), moreover, Jordan and Israel agreed upon the armistice demarcation lines “without
prejudice to future territorial settlement or boundary lines or to claims of either Party
relating thereto.”177
¶47
It is ironic that the Palestinians are now championing the Green Line, as they have
never considered it as binding on them or limiting Palestinian aspirations, 178 yet they

170

Hague Regulations, supra note 168, pmbl. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et
al., supra note 14, paras. 52, 54, 55; Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 7957/04, 1348/05
Mara’abe v. the Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC, paras. 7, 18 (in Hebrew, on file with author); A
Temporary Measure, supra note 132.
172
See, e.g., Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et
al., supra note 14, para. 54; Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 7957/04, 1348/05 Mara’abe v.
Prime Minister, supra note 171, para. 16; IDF Fact Sheet, supra note 136.
173
See Written Statement on Jurisdiction and Propriety, supra note 160, para. 3.45; Gil Sedan,
Backgrounder: Green Line Began as Cease-Fire Line, But Now Has Great Political Meaning, Jewish
Telegraphic Agency, http://www.jta.org/page_view_story.asp?intarticleid=11468&intcategoryid=1 (last
visited Nov. 20, 2005).
174
Some notable examples are the village of Barta’a in the Wadi Ara region and two Arab villages
further south. See Sedan, supra note 173.
175
Hashemite Jordan Kingdom – Israel: General Armistice Agreement (1949),
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/f03d55e 48f77ab698525643b00608
d34!OpenDocument.
176
Id. art. II(2); Written Statement of the Government of Israel, supra note 160, at para. 3.47.
177
Hashemite Jordan Kingdom – Israel: General Armistice Agreement, supra note 175, art. IV(9);
Written Statement on Jurisdiction and Propriety, supra note 160, para. 3.47.
178
See, e.g., the re ference to a letter to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan by Palestinian
United Nations Observer Nasser al-Kidwa, in Palestinian Envoy Queries Israel’s Pre-1967 Borders,
FUTURE NEWS: THE DAILY REPORT , Mar. 26, 1999,
http://www.future.com.lb/news/archive/1999/e2603.htm.
171
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reveal their own motives when they nonetheless demand that the “Green Line”
unilaterally bind Israel. 179
¶48
Taking into account current relevant topographical, demographic, and strategic
criteria, 180 and not antiquated map lines that were never intended to serve as a permanent
border, 181 is thus the only way to effectively and efficiently attempt to create an effectual
defense against terrorism. In planning the route of the fence, great effort is in parallel
made to minimize the disruption to both Palestinian as well as Israeli daily life along its
route. 182
¶49
A substantial Israeli population that has been a constant victim of terrorism
currently lives on the other side of the “Green Line” in the disputed territories, the final
status of which, according to international agreements with the Palestinians, is to be
negotiated. 183 Until direct negotiations between the parties resolve this final status,
however, the Israeli government, just as any government in the world, must endeavor to
protect its citizenry from terrorist atrocities. 184 The government of Israel, therefore, is
obligated to defend all its citizens, including those living in disputed territories, in the
best, most effective way possible. 185 The Oslo Agreements with the Palestinians in fact
gave Israel “the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and Settlements, for the
purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order” and granted Israel “all
the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.”186
179
Peculiarly, in the Written Statement submitted by Palestine (Request for an Advisory Opinion),
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International
Court of Justice, Jan. 30, 2004, the Palestinians demonstratively contend that “the former border [is] . . . the
‘Green Line’ . . . .” Id. at 77. “There is no doubt that Israel has, in principle, the right to construct a wall
on Israeli soil, along the Israeli side of the Green Line . . . . Israel plainly has both the legal right to build a
security wall on its own territory along the Green Line and the practical possibility and ability to do so,”
declared the Palestinian Written Statement to the International Court. Id. at 198.
180
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, paras. 60, 64; Not a Border, supra note 130; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Concept and
Guidelines: The Route,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45876&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005) [hereinafter The Route].
181
See Written Statement on Jurisdiction and Propriety, supra note 160, para. 3.48.
182
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, paras. 63, 68; Not a Border, supra note 130; The Route, supra note 180; Impact on
Palestinians, supra note 132.
183
According to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, the two sides
understand that the “negotiations shall cover remain ing issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements,
security arrangements, border relations and cooperation with their neighbors, and other issues of common
interest.” Declaration of Principles, supra note 15, art. V (emphasis added); see also Israel’s Response in
the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al., supra note 14, para. 52.
184
See, e.g., HCJ 4219/02 Gusen v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip [2002] (Barak, C.J.),
IsrSC (in Hebrew), available at http://62.90.71.124/files/02/190/042/a03/02042190.a03.HTM (last visited
Mar. 8, 2005); HCJ 4363/02 Zindah. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip [2002] IsrSC (in
Hebrew), available at http://62.90.71.124/files/02/630/043/a02/02043630.a02.HTM (last visited Mar. 8,
2005); see also HCJ 72/86 Zelum, v. Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, 41(1) IsrSC
528, 532 (Barak, J.) (in Hebrew).
185
See, e.g., Zelum, supra note 184, at 532; see also HCJ 256/72 Electric Company for the Jerusalem
District, Ltd. v. Minister of Defence [1972], 27(1) IsrSC 124, 138 (Landau, J.) (in Hebrew); Zindah, supra
note 184; Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, para. 61.
186
Interim, supra note 15, art. XII (emphasis added). Under the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements, as well, Israel was specifically authorized to take such measures in the
disputed territories as would safeguard the security of Israelis there and public order there. See Declaration

261

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2005

VI. UNCONVENTIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
¶50

In the Israel High Court of Justice ruling, Ajuri v. Commander of IDF Forces,
Chief Justice 187 Aharon Barak accentuated, and in essence summarized, the exceptionally
problematic circumstances confronting the State of Israel as follows:
Since the end of the month of September 2000, fierce warfare has been
taking place in the regions of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. This
is not a police action. This is an armed conflict . . . . A new and harsh
reality has been placed before the State of Israel, which is fighting for its
security and the security of its citizens. 188

¶51

The High Court of Justice, in a previous decision Kanan v. Commander of IDF
Forces in Judea and Samaria, emphasized that “in the area of Judea and Samaria and the
Gaza Strip actual warfare incidents have been taking place.”189 In Ibrahim v. Commander
of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria, another decision of the High Court, dealing
specifically with the security barrier, the Court spoke of “the state of warfare which has
prevailed in the Region.”190
¶52
While on the one hand, the scale and intensity of the events, particularly over the
last five years, certainly justify the classification of the situation as an armed conflict 191 as
Israel Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak as well as other Supreme Court justices
have vividly explained, war is classically defined as a conflict between the military
apparatuses of two or more States,192 a condition which the Palestinian-Israel situation
does not meet. 193 Despite this conceptual dilemma, “one may need to place antiterrorist
actions within the international legal paradigm of war, rather than unbroken peace,”
according to Ruth Wedgwood, “with a right of ongoing offensive action against an
adversary’s paramilitary operations and network.”194 It might perhaps therefore be most
suitable to classify the legal position between the Palestinians and Israel as indeed an
“armed conflict,” though one “short of war.”195 “[A]n armed conflict exists,” held the
of Principles, supra note 15, art. VIII.
187
The official title of the head of the Israel Supreme Court is “President.” For the sake of convenience
and for purposes of clarification, the term “Chief Justice” will be used in this Article.
188
HCJ 7015, 7019/02 Ajuri v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank [2002] (Barak, C.J.), IsrSC
(in Hebrew) (emphasis added), http://62.90.71.124/files/02/150/070/a15/02070150.a15.HTM (last visited
Mar. 8, 2005).
189
HCJ 2461/01 Kanan v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria [2001] IsrSC (in Hebrew)
(emphasis added), http://62.90.71.124/files/01/610/024/g04/01024610.g04.HTM (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
190
Ibrahim, supra note 132 (emphasis added).
191
See, e.g., Tracy Wilkinson, Israeli Activists Urge Army to Probe Civilian Slayings, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
31, 2001, available at http://www.ccmep.org/hotnews2/123101latimes.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
The dimensions of the conflict as far as the magnitude of clashes between the sides and the extent of
casualties make this a war, explains Col. Daniel Reisner, then head of the international law division of the
Israel Defense Forces. See id.
192
See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM , II INTERNATIONAL LAW : A TREATISE : DISPUTES, W AR AND NEUTRALITY
202 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) (emphasis added).
193
Col. Reisner [see supra note 191] points out that strictly speaking, the confrontation is not
technically a formal state of war. See Wilkinson, supra note 191.
194
Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT ’L L. 559,
575 (1999).
195
Col. Reisner [see supra note 191] describes the Palestinian terrorist violence as an “armed conflict
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “whenever there is a resort to
armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups . . . .”196 Israel is thus “engaged in an armed
conflict short of war. This is not a civilian disturbance or a demonstration or a riot. It is
characterized by live- fire attacks on a significant scale . . . . [T]he attacks are carried out
by a well-armed and organized militia . . . .”197
¶53
In similar fashion, U.S. President George W. Bus h signed a military order two
months after the horrendous September 11, 2001 suicide terrorist attacks in the United
States, acknowledging that these terrible attacks were of a magnitude creating a state of
armed conflict:
International terrorists, including members of al Qaida, have carried out
attacks on United States diplomatic and military personnel and facilities
abroad and on citizens and property within the United States on a scale
that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the
United States Armed Forces.198
¶54

The theatre of war, though, has changed from that of the past; now the whole world
is a potential arena for conducting the war against terror. “[O]ur war on terror,” declared
President Bush, “will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past.
This war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan.”199
¶55
The main connotation of a “state of armed conflict” is the applicability of the rules
of armed conflict recognized as the laws of war, 200 irrespective of whether the
international armed conflicts falls short of a full- fledged war. 201 When considered in a
pragmatic manner, the circumstances surrounding attacks carried out by non-State
elements moreover may make little difference to the overall application of the laws of

short of war” due to the dimensions and magnitude of the conflict. See Wilkinson, supra note 191. A
similar depiction of the situation as “an armed conflict short of war” appears in other sources as well. See,
e.g., Sharm El- Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report (“the Mitchell Report”) (Apr. 30, 2001)
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm (last visited July 2, 2005). While war in its material meaning is
“a comprehensive use of force in the relations between two or more States” [Inter-State Wars, supra note
45, at 140 (emphasis omitted)], even recurrent, extensive incidents taking place might still be regarded as
“short of war.” Id. at 142.
196
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Oct. 2, 1995), (emphasis added), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005); U.K. M INISTRY OF
DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 15.3.1.
197
Sharm El-Sheikh, supra note 195 (citations omitted).
198
President Issues Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html (emphasis added). Cf. Jennifer
Elsea, Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals Before Military Commissions,
CRS Report for Congress (Updated Dec. 11, 2001), CRS-14,
http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7951.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
199
Radio Address of the President to the Nation, Sept. 29, 2001,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html (last visited July 2, 2005).
200
Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 196, para. 70; U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE
LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 15.3.1.
201
See CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 73, at 14.
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war, irrespective of the issues that arise from a theoretical standpoint. 202 “I think that
despite the fact that the terrorists present an unconventional foe,” explains Charles Allen,
Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, “the
fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict have proven themselves to be
applicable to this conflict . . . . With regard to the global war on terrorism, wherever it
may reach, the law of armed conflict certainly does apply.”203 As Antonio Cassese
consequently explains, “the body of international customary and treaty rules relating to
international armed conflicts, in particular to occupatio bellica of foreign territory” is the
law applicable to the hostilities between Israel and Palestinian terrorists. 204 The same
rules that apply in traditional, “battlefield” wars will be controlling in the war on
terrorism, as well. 205
¶56
Notwithstanding the characterization of the current conflict between Israel and
Palestinian terrorists as an international armed conflict, the conflict is of a unique nature.
This is not, after all, an armed conflict between two sides applying a similar set of rules
to regulate their conduct. This is, rather, a conflict between the forces of a State
committed to the rule of law and to the conduct of hostilities in accordance with the laws
of war, and terrorist groups blatantly disregarding the most fundamental rules relating to
the conduct of war. 206 Waging this armed conflict from the midst of innocent Palestinian
civilians, the terrorist organizations violate the most sacred principle of the laws of war—
the principle of distinction. The terrorists violate the principle of distinction in every way
possible by refusing to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants as objects of
their attacks and by refusing to distinguish themselves as combatants from civilians
which would avoid the unintentional harming of innocent people.
¶57
The unique characteristics of this conflict are further underscored by Israel
Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak:

202

Cf. Elsea, supra note 198, at CRS-11-12.
Anthony Dworkin, Law and the Campaign Against Terror: The Case from the Pentagon, GLOBAL
POLICY FORUM , Dec. 16, 2002, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2002/1216terror.htm (last
visited Nov. 20, 2005).
204
Antonio Cassese, Expert Opinion on Whether Israel’s Targeted Killings of Palestinian Terrorists Is
Consonant with International Humanitarian Law 2, in the Matter Concerning HCJ 769/02 The Public
Committee Against Torture v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC (in Hebrew),
http://www.stoptorture.org.il/eng/images/uploaded/publications/64.pdf (last visited July 2, 2005); see
Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed
Conflict, 98 AJIL 1, 28 (2004).
205
See, e.g., Adam Roberts, Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War, Social Science
Research Council / After Sept. 11, http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/roberts_text_only.htm; 44 (1)
SURVIVAL 7 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (2002).
206
It would be an incongruous war indeed “under circumstances in which we have no real assurance
that our adversaries will obey the new rules of the game faithfully,” pointed out Brigadier General C. B.
Micelwait, then Assistant Judge Advocate General of the United States Army over fifty years ago [cited in
VON GLAHN, supra note 164, at 169], referring to the “added responsibilities on the part of the occupant, in
consequence of Article 55,” relating to the introduction of “a rather drastic addition to the legal principles
concerned with the food supply of occupied territory.” Id. Hence, “it is impossible,” writes Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht, “to visualize the conduct of hostilities in which one side would be bound by rules of warfare
without benefiting from them and the other side would benefit from rules of warfare without being bound
by them.” Hersch Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 206, 212 (1953).
203
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Israel’s warfare is complicated. The Palestinian side uses, inter alia,
“guided human bombs.” These suicide bombers get to any place where
there are Israelis (inside the State of Israel and in the Jewish communities
in the areas of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip). They sow death and
destruction in cities and villages. Indeed, the forces fighting Israel are
terrorists; they are not part of a regular army; they do not wear uniforms;
they hide among the Palestinian civilian population in the region,
including in holy places; they enjoy the support of a portion of the civilian
population in general, and the support of their family members and
relatives in particular. 207
It is within this environment that Israel, like other States combating terrorism, must
conduct its military operations. These unique characteristics require certain adaptations of
the traditional laws of war and hence require States in the forefront of the fight against
terrorism to constantly examine the rules and assumptions under which they operate and
attempt to apply, as best as possible, rules originally developed for armies clashing under
conditions of parity.
¶58
Another special characteristic of this particular type of armed conflict lies in the
fact that acts of hostility are not continuously perpetrated throughout the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, rather several different legal regimes exist on the ground simultaneously. 208 In
certain places an armed conflict is taking place, while in others life goes on normally.
The international rules of occupation govern in some places while other places operate
under the sui generis regime created by the Oslo accords.
¶59
Israel’s actions in the West Bank 209 vis-á-vis the security barrier may be examined
in light of two basic sets of rules applicable to the current situation: (1) the laws of
warfare and (2) the laws of belligerent occupation. 210 Following the determination that a
207

Ajuri, supra note 188.
Cf. U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122,
para. 1.33.6.
209
A consequence of defensive measures in a war not of Israel’s choosing and not waged on Israel’s
initiative, was that among the territory that Israel found itself in control of was territory that had been
formerly occupied by Jordan, one of the states that had attacked Israel in June 1967. See, e.g., Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Legal Aspects: Legal Status of the Land,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45870&MissionID=45187&Lang
uageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). Jordan had illegally occupied this
territory since the failure of its attempt, along with that of other Arab States [see, e.g., JULIUS STONE, NO
PEACE —NO W AR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 39 (1969)], to prevent the creation of Israel [see, e.g., Meir
Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government—The Initial Stage, in M EIR
SHAMGAR, ed., M ILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES A DMINISTERED BY ISRAEL, 1967– 1980: THE
LEGAL A SPECTS 13, 34 (1982)] and to destroy it in 1948– 1949. In 1950 the area that Jordan had militarily
occupied was annexed by it, thereby creating the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Id. No Arab state ever
recognized Jordanian annexation of this territory. See STONE , supra. Neither did the Arab League ever
recognize this annexation. In fact, only two states in the world ever recognized it: Pakistan and the United
Kingdom. See, e.g., Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and
Samaria, 3 I SRAEL L. REV. 279, 290 (1968); Dore Gold, Jerusalem in International Diplomacy (2005),
http://www.jcpa.org/jcprg10.htm.
210
Although it does not view the Fourth Geneva Convention to be strictly applicable, de jure, Israel
nevertheless does apply its humanitarian provisions. See Shamgar, supra note 209, at 42. Irrespective of
whether or not the Fourth Geneva Convention is formally applicable to the disputed territories, it is
consequently Israeli policy to distinguish its “practical approach from the formal legal questions and to act
in accordance both with customary international law and de facto with the humanitarian provisions of the
208
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situation of armed conflict exists, and that the body of relevant rules for the examination
of the situation before us is the laws of armed conflict, jus in bello, considerations of jus
ad bellum justifications for the use of force are no longer relevant. A consequence of
having concluded that a situation of armed conflict already exists, as in the situation
between Israel and the Palestinians, is that the question of the legality of the use force in
the first place is no longer relevant. 211 The law of international armed conflict does not
distinguish between the civilians or the armed forces of the aggressor and those of the
adversary acting in self-defense. 212 Yet despite the focus of this Article on jus in bello, it
nevertheless bears mention that to the extent that jus ad bellum would be relevant, Israel,
just as any other State, is permitted to exercise its inherent right of self-defense to thwart
terrorist attacks against it and its citizens and to rid itself of any threat caused by the
terrorists. 213 The International Court of Justice itself not only recognizes Israel’s right to
act against terrorists but specifically holds that Israel is duty-bound to take action to
protect its citizens: “The fact remains that Israel has to face numerous indiscriminate and

Convention . . . .” Id. See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime
Minister et al., supra note 14, para. 179; Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 7957/04, 1348/05
Mara’abe v. Prime Minister, supra note 171; Yuval Yoaz, Evaluation in the Ministry of Justice: Retreat
from the Philidelphi Axis Will be Considered in the World as the Termination of the Occupation in the
Gaza Strip, HA’A RETZ, Dec. 19, 2004 (in Hebrew, on file with author). Nevertheless, an Israeli interministerial committee [see id.] and the legal adviser to the government [see Yuval Yoaz, Between Hague
and the Disengagement, the Adviser Tries to End Putting the Head in Sand in Relation to International
Law, HA’A RETZ, Jan. 5, 2005, at 5A (in Hebrew, on file with author)] suggested not long ago that the
Government of Israel set up a professional team to examine the de-jure application of the Fourth Geneva
Convention in the disputed territories. In support of this new approach, Dinstein perceptively points out that
because Israel in reality does apply the Geneva Conventions, there is no advantage in maintaining a concept
that has outlived its usefulness. See id. Yet, as mentioned, despite serious doubts over the de jure
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel nonetheless has applied the Fourth Geneva
Convention’s humanitarian provisions to its administration of the territories.
Israel moreover decided at the outset of its administration of the territory that the Military
Government’s actions would be subject to judicial review by its High Court of Justice. See Shamgar, supra
note 209, at 42-43. The Israel High Court of Justice therefore holds public officials acting in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip on behalf of the Civil and Military Administration to the principles of
administrative law applicable to Israeli civil servants. See, e.g., Itta v. Commander of the Judea and
Samaria Area, HCJ 69/81, 37(2) IsrSC 197, 231 (in Hebrew). Residents of these areas who stand to be
harmed by an administrative action accordingly enjoy due process protections similar to those afforded
Israeli citizens. What this means in practical terms is that even though there exist no provisions in either
the Fourth Hague Convention [see Hague Regulations, supra note 168], or the Fourth Geneva Convention
[see Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39], requiring the occupier to allow the occupied population access
to its national courts, since 1967 when the Military Government was set up in the West Bank, the
territories’ inhabitants have been able to pursue claims against Israel, the Military Government, and all its
authorities in Israeli courts. As there is no other known instance of allowing the residents of occupied
territory to bring such actions against the occupying authorities [see Eli Nathan, The Power of Supervision
of the High Court of Justice over Military Government, in M EIR SHAMGAR, ed., M ILITARY GOVERNMENT IN
THE TERRITORIES A DMINISTERED BY ISRAEL, 1967–1980: THE LEGAL A SPECTS 109, 110 (1982)], the access
that Israel has granted Palestinians to its highest court is therefore most likely unprecedented.
Parenthetically, local courts in occupied territory have no authority under international law over the
occupying power. See VON GLAHN, supra note 164, at 108; Nathan, supra, at 109.
211
See, e.g., Iain Scobbie, Words My Mother Never Taught Me – “In Defense of the International
Court,” 99 AJIL 76, 83-84 (2005).
212
See CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 73, at 4; see also Protocol I, supra note 43, prmbl.;
Greenwood, supra note 51, at 10.
213
See, e.g., Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et
al., supra note 14, para. 168.
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deadly acts of violence against its civilian population. It has the right, and indeed the
duty, to respond in order to protect the life of its citizens.”214
VII.

HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS VERSUS MILITARY N ECESSITY

¶60

A fundamental principle that underlies the law of armed conflict, expounds the
2004 British Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, is military necessity, which allows a
State involved in an armed conflict situation to use “that degree and kind of force, not
otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required in order to achieve the
legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the enemy
at the earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and resources.”215
Similarly, the tribunal in the Hostages Case held that “[m]ilitary necessity permits a
belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel
the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life
and money.”216 Regarding “[t]he practical application of the principle of military
necessity. . . in the context of belligerent occupation,” the British law of armed conflict
manual, citing the Hostages Case, elucidates that “[i]t is lawful to destroy railways, lines
of communication or any other property that might be utilised by the enemy. Private
homes and churches even may be destroyed if necessary for military operations.”217 At
the same time, however, today’s rules, founded on the Hague Conventions of 1907, deal
with, among other things, regulating the use of force in wartime and what steps may be
employed by an occupying State in occup ied territory, as well as who may be allowed to
benefit from the status of a belligerent. 218 The Hague regulations thus basically deal with
the conduct of military operations. 219
¶61
Following World War II, the innovative Fourth Geneva Conve ntion represented a
crucial development towards protecting civilians who were not nationals of the State

214

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note
9, sec. 141 (emphasis added); see Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v.
Prime Minister et al., supra note 14, para. 35.
215
U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para.
2.2 (emphasis added).
216
The Hostages Trial, Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, VIII LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF W AR
CRIMINALS 34, 66 (1949); Case No. 47, The Hostages Trial, Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, United States
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Part IV, available at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/List4.htm.
217
U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para.
2.2.3 (emphasis added).
218
See M ALCOLM N. SHAW , INTERNATIONAL LAW 729–30 (1991). The Hague Conventions, which
reflect “the law of armed conflict written from the standpoint of the soldier, in the sense that it takes the
form of a statement of the rights and duties of the military in a conflict” [Greenwood, supra note 51, at 18],
“have been largely recognized as customary law.” Id. at 24. See U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE
M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 16.27; CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra
note 73, at 10. The Fourth Hague Convention and its Regulations—which were held by the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal [see International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences,
October 1, 1946, Judgment, 41 AJIL 172, 248-49 (1947)] and by the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East in Tokyo in 1948 [see CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 73, at 10], to be customary
international law and hence binding on every state—“remain of the utmost importance,” with Articles 42–
56 still constituting “the principal text on the government of occupied territory and the treatment of
property in occupied territory.” Greenwood, supra note 51, at 24, 25.
219
See U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122,
para. 1.9.
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under whose power they found themselves due either to war or occupation. The Geneva
principles were founded on the protection of civilians not actively participating in war
and who should be dealt with in a humanitarian manner. 220 The Geneva rules therefore
essentially relate to the protection of armed conflict’s victims. 221 The Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conve ntions 222 that were agreed to in 1977 essentially further
expanded the existing principles. 223
¶62
Generally speaking, those not taking part in actual warfare are to be distinguished
from combatants. 224 The Fourth Geneva Convention thus elaborates the rules to apply to
protect civilians during war, 225 and Protocol I recognizes the principle that military
operations may be directed only against military targets. Moreover, there must be a
distinction made between military targets and civilians, as well as between the
combatants and the civilian population as such. 226 A paramount precept of the laws of
war is the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants. As the U.K.
Ministry of Defence’s Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict makes clear,
[t]he law of armed conflict protects members of the civilian population by
making a distinction between combatants, who take part in the fighting,
and non-combatants, who do not take part in the fighting and who must be
shielded, as far as possible, from its effects . . . . 227 So long as they do not
take a direct part in hostilities, non-combatants are not legitimate targets of
attack . . . . 228
“Failure on the part of combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians,” warns the
British law of armed conflict manual, “can only result in a real risk that civilians will be
mistaken for combatants.”229 Thus, each of the two groups, combatants and noncombatants, “has distinct rights and duties. An individual who belongs to one class is not
permitted at the same time to enjoy the privileges of the other class.”230 The purpose of
this fundamental distinction, explains Yoram Dinstein, “is to ensure in every feasible
manner that international armed conflicts be waged solely among the combatants of the
belligerent Parties. Lawful combatants can attack enemy combatants or military
objectives, causing death, injury and destruction.”231 In fact, all combatants can be

220

See SHAW , supra note 218, at 730.
See U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122,
para. 1.9.
222
Protocol I, supra note 43; Protocol II, supra note 43.
223
See SHAW , supra note 218, at 730-31. However, the Protocols have not attained the almost universal
recognition realized by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and have yet to be applied officially to any
significant international armed conflict. See Greenwood, supra note 51, at 25.
224
See SHAW , supra note 218, at 731.
225
See id. at 733.
226
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lawfully targeted. This includes all members of the armed forces, whether or not they are
actually engaged in combat.”232 As Michael Schmitt explains, “the general directing
operations miles from battle is as valid a target as the commander leading his troops into
combat.”233 Once one is a combatant, “the law of war clearly permit[s] targeting him.”234
Thus, “lawful targeting in wartime has never required that the individual actually be
engaged in combat.”235 Two instances from World War II, both occurring in 1943, will
suffice to illustrate this. In an attempt to capture or kill Field Marshal Rommel, the
British conducted a commando raid at Beda Littoria, 236 and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto,
the Japanese fleet’s commander- in-chief, was killed in the crash of an airplane when it
was ambushed and downed by American P-38’s. 237
In contrast, civilians are not allowed to participate actively in the fighting;
if they do, they lose their status as civilians . . . . 238 [A] person cannot (and
is not allowed to) be both a combatant and a civilian at the same time, nor
can he constantly shift from one status to the other . . . . [O]ne cannot
fight the enemy and remain a civilian . . . . 239
Anyone who claims the privileges of the laws of war “must himself respect the laws from
which he proposes to benefit.”240
¶63
“[I]nternational law in general and the law of armed conflict in particular recognize
that individuals who directly take part in hostilities cannot claim immunity from attack or
protection as innocent civilians.”241 Accordingly, individuals who become combatants are
deemed to continue being combatants until the end to the hostilities and not merely
during that exact instant when they are organizing, instigating, or executing an attack.
They are therefore considered legitimate military targets both while planning attacks as
well as after they have been perpetrated. 242
¶64
In fact, a State engaged in legitimate defensive actions against illegal combatants
involved in an ongoing sequence of terrorist acts against a State and/or its inhabitants
(acts of terror by these illegal combatants which could be considered in and of themselves
as crimes against humanity, crimes against the peace and security of mankind, or
arguably even war-crimes against the attacked State and its inhabitants), could not
logically be subject to greater legal restrictions on its scope of action than would be
applicable if the State were engaged in legitimate defensive actions against legal
combatants of an army of a foreign hostile State. Any other conclusion would mean that
232
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terrorists as illegal combatants could hold a better status or enjoy greater immunities than
would be the case if they were part of an army of another State and fighting as legal
combatants in a war against the first State.
The two branches of the law applicable to armed conflict situations, the “Hague
law” and the “Geneva law,” now “have become so closely interrelated,” opined the
International Court of Justice in 1996, “that they are considered to have gradually formed
one single complex system, known today as international humanitarian law.”243
It is through these laws of war that the international community consequently
endeavors to bring some measure of order to the conduct of hostilities between States. 244
By imposing rules that require participants to carry out hostilities in a humane fashion
and protect the victims of war during the course of conflict, the international law of
armed conflict attempts to preserve a fine and sensitive balance between humanitarian
concerns and military necessity. 245 Thus, in striving to attain military advantage, the
amount of suffering that is necessarily incurred as a result must not be disproportionate.246
“The conduct of armed hostilities on land is regulated by the law of land warfare,”
explains the U.S. Army Field Manual No. FM27-10 of The Law of Land Warfare, and “is
inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war by . . . [p]rotecting both combatants
and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering;” by “[s]afeguarding certain fundamental
human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of
war, the wounded and sick, and civilians;” and by “[f]acilitating the restoration of
peace.”247 As the British military manual points out, “[t]he law of armed conflict is
consistent with the economic and efficient use of force. It is intended to minimize the
suffering caused by armed conflict rather than impede military efficiency.”248
Specifically regarding occupied territory, Gerhard von Glahn points out that “[i]n
view of the fact that the occupant exercises administrative control in the territory under
his authority and . . . is obliged to restore public order and safety as far as possible, it
appears that the occupied territory should be administered not only in the (military and
other) interests of the occupant, but also to the greatest possible extent for the good of the
native inhabitants.”249
Nevertheless, “if benevolent humanitarianism were the only beacon to guide the
path of armed forces, war would have entailed no bloodshed, no destruction and no
human suffering; in short, war would not have been war.”250 Though on the other hand,
“[i]f military necessity were to prevail completely, no limitation of any kind would have
been imposed on the freedom of action of belligerent States . . . .”251 In reality, the law of
international armed conflict “takes a middle road, allowing belligerent States much
243

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice,
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leeway (in keeping with the demands of military necessity) and yet circumscribing their
freedom of action (in the name of humanitarianism).”252 In essence, “[t]he laws of war,”
elucidates Yoram Dinstein,
are all based on a subtle balance between two opposing considerations:
military necessity, on the one hand, and humanitarian sentiments, on the
other. . . . Each one of the laws of war discloses a balance between
military necessity and humanitarian sentiments, as produced by the
framers of international conventions or as crystallized in the practice of
States. The equilibrium may be imperfect, but it is legally binding in the
very form that it is constructed. 253
The laws of war have thus in effect created a delicate equilibrium between two
parameters: humanitarian principles and military necessity. Yet, while the freedom of
action of the belligerents is restricted, they nevertheless retain a great deal of latitude in
the conduct of their military activities. According to Dinstein:
It is possible to say that the whole purpose of the laws of warfare—to use
the language of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration—is “alleviating as
much as possible the calamities of war.” The thrust of the concept is not
absolute mitigation of the calamities of war, but relief from tribulations of
war “as much as possible,” meaning as much as possible considering the
fundamental interest of each belligerent to win the war. 254
As D.W. Greig explains:
Somewhere there has to be a compromise between humanitarian ideals
and the realities of the demands of a war situation. As the preamble to the
1907 [Hague] Convention put it, the wording of the provisions contained
therein was “inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as
military requirements permit.”255
¶69

“[I]t is important to keep constantly in mind the sobering thought,” writes Yoram
Dinstein,
that wars are fought to be won . . . . Almost by definition, [war] entails
human losses, suffering and pain. As long as it is waged, humanitarian
considerations cannot be the sole legal arbiters of the conduct of
hostilities. The law of international armed conflict can and does forbid
some modes of behaviour, with a view to minimizing the losses, the
252
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suffering and the pain. But it can do so only when there are realistic
alternatives to achieving the military goal of victory in war. Should
nothing be theoretically permissible to a belligerent engaged in war,
ultimately everything will be permitted in practice – because the rules will
be ignored. 256
¶70

Armed conflict rules are thus “predicated on a subtle equilibrium between two
diametrically opposed impulses: military necessity and humanitarian considerations,”
explains Dinstein. Each armed conflict law norm
confronts a built- in tension between the relentless demands of military
necessity and humanitarian considerations, working out a compromise
formula. The outlines of the compromise vary from one [law of
international armed conflict] norm to another. Still, in general terms, it can
be stated categorically that no part of [the law of international armed
conflict] overlooks military requirements, just as no part of [the law of
international armed conflict] loses sight of humanitarian considerations.
All segments of this body of law are stimulated by a realistic (as distinct
from a purely idealistic) approach to armed conflict. 257

¶71

The thrust behind the law of war’s prevailing guideline of “alleviating as much as
possible the calamities of war” is thus “not absolute mitigation of the calamities of war
(which would be utterly impractical), but relief from the tribulations of war ‘as much as
possible’; that is to say, as much as possible considering that war is prosecuted for
military ends, and the ascendant objective of each belligerent State is to win the war.”258
In other words, the laws of war strive to strike a compromise between military necessity
and humanitarian considerations, 259 taking into account of course that “[a] belligerent is
entitled to do whatever is dictated by military necessity in order to win the war, provided
that the act does not exceed the bounds of legitimacy” in accordance with the law of
international armed conflict. 260
¶72
But exactly how is “military necessity” to be determined? Military necessity during
war can mean necessary acts undertaken to directly support particular military actions or
actions the cumulative effect of which is destruction of the war-making capacity of the
enemy, which consequently draw the war to a close more quickly. “The first and most
dominant” of the basic, fundamental princ iples according to which war is to be conducted
and the means which can be used to conduct it is “the principle of military necessity,”
writes Morris Greenspan. “That is, the right to apply that amount and kind of force that
is necessary to compel the submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of
time, life, and money.”261 As defined in the U.S. Army Field Manual No. FM27-10 on
The Law of Land Warfare, “military necessity” means “that principle which justifies
256
257
258
259
260
261
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those measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing
the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.”262 In similar fashion,
according to both the 2004 British law of armed conflict manual263 and the Hostages
Case,264 as mentioned earlier, a State engaged in armed conflict is permitted to use “that
degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is
required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or
partial submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum
expenditure of life and resources.”265
¶73
Quite understandably, explains Greenspan, “‘[t]he question in what circumstances a
necessity arises cannot be decided by any hard-and-fast rule.’”266 Although some have
contended, for example, that in an armed conflict situation, a State may use force
“necessary for the achievement of the goals of that state,”267 perhaps the most sound
explanation of “military necessity” during armed conflict situations is indeed that of
Greenspan:
In judging actions of destruction and seizure of property committed under
a plea of military necessity, a fair standard to be applied in assessing their
justifiability would be that of their reasonableness. In other words, would
a reasonably prudent commander acting in compliance with the laws of
war have authorized such destruction or seizure under similar
circumstances. In applying such a test due latitude should be allowed for
the stress under which men make their decisions in conducting military
operations, and they should be judged according to the conditions under
which they operated, rather than whether the y would have made the same
decision looking back on the matter from the unhurried calm of courtroom proceedings. Wanton destruction and seizure may be distinguished
from that which is necessary by the gross disparity between the extent of
the destruction and seizure and any valid reason for it. 268
¶74

As the tribunal in the Hostages Case ruled, “[t]he destruction of property to be
lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end
262
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in itself is a violation of International Law. There must be some reasonable connection
between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces.”269
¶75
For an occupying power, the primary consideration, according to von Glahn, “is the
prosecution of the war to a successful conclusion.”270 As he points out, however, in the
typical occupation scenario the military necessity in an area being administered by an
occupying power is likely to be somewhat different than military necessity during actual
combat:
[F]ew if any of the measures likely to be undertaken by occupation
authorities in enemy territory will reasonably contribute decisively to the
end of the conflict, to the surrender of the enemy, or will be invested with
supremely vital character . . . . It must be remembered that practically all
measures of real importance undertaken by an occupant in hostile territory
fall in a period of time when the military phase of active hostilities has
passed from the occupied territory . . . . 271
¶76

The circumstances that Israel faces, however, are far from the typical occupation
scenario, with thousands of Israeli casualties to bear witness to this uncharacteristic
occupation situation. Von Glahn consequently concludes that the occupation authorities’
judgment as to whether a case of military necessity exists that would justify the
commission of certain acts otherwise forbidden, 272 “has to be measured against the known
facts and, if at all possible, against any evidence that there existed an honest conviction to
the effect that necessity proper existed.”273 As von Glahn makes clear, if it can be
demonstrated that “an urgent need” impelled an action whereby a rule qualified by
necessity had to be set aside and “the breach of the rule was accomplished, not by rash
individual action, but under some form of supervised regulation or administration, then
the plea of necessity would normally be upheld as valid.”274
¶77
In other words, where international humanitarian law expressly provides for
engaging in prescribed behavior due to military necessity, these actions are
permissible. 275 Such an allowance for reasons of military necessity constitutes an integral
part of international humanitarian law in armed conflict situations and reflects an
intentional balance between humanitarian principles and the demands incumbent in war
in the form of military necessity. 276 Although normal life of the occupied area’s
inhabitants must be ensured to the extent possible, the rights and obligations of an
occupied territory’s military regime must be characterized by its own needs as well. 277
¶78
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations stipulates that “the occupant . . . shall take all
the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and
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safety . . . .”278 Certainly the duty to ensure public order and safety includes the
maintena nce of an orderly administration that embraces security, 279 and military necessity
can be a legitimate consideration for an occupying power’s endeavors in occupied
territory. 280 It is consequently not possible to divorce the purposes of the war from
military necessity that, as a matter of course, may include defending the citizens of the
occupying State. The occupying authority, especially in a situation of ongoing
belligerency, is responsible for precluding within the occupied area imminent dangers not
only to the occupied region but also to the occupying power as well. The military facet is
then actually one and the same as the facet of security. As Justice Witkon held in the
Israel High Court of Justice case Ayoub v. Minister of Defense regarding seizing land in
occupied territory:
[T]he existing situation is one of belligerency, and the occup ying power
has the responsibility to ensure order and security in the occupied territory.
It must also meet the dangers posed from such territory to the occupied
territory itself and to the State itself. The warfare these days has taken the
form of acts of terror, and even one who views these acts (which harm
innocent civilians) as a form of guerilla war, will admit that the occupying
power is authorized and even obligated to take all the necessary measures
to prevent them. The military aspect and the security aspect are only
therefore a single aspect. 281
¶79

In other words, military necessity may include the occupant’s actions, undertaken
in occupied territory, designed to have a defensive effect beyond it and applied to the
occupying State’s territory. 282 “‘The occupation of a foreign territory does not represent
an end in itself,’” comments Ernst Fraenkel, citing the remarks of one observer following
World War I; “‘its end is the realization or the protection of certain public interests; it is
an act of sovereignty. The occupying power makes use of its army, which is nothing else
but its executive agent, in order to exercise its sovereignty and to realize and protect its
interests.’”283 In referring specifically to the granting to military tribunals jurisdiction in
all matters touching on the occupying army’s security, the same observer, again cited by
Fraenkel, emphasizes that this was “‘ intended to protect not only the army itself but also
the state of which it is the executive agent, and that state’s sovereignty and
independence.’”284
¶80
It had become excruciatingly and painfully obvious that in order to protect Israel
and Israelis against terrorist attacks, and particularly against suicide terrorism, a barrier
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was necessary between most of the territory’s Palestinian residents and most Israelis. The
Israel government’s Ministerial Committee for National Security Matters therefore
decided to construct a security barrier for “‘improving and strengthening the operational
capabilities and preparedness in the framework of contending with terrorism, and in order
to foil, disrupt and prevent the infiltration of terror activities from the area of Judea and
Samaria to Israel.’”285 The Israel government subsequently approved this decision. 286
¶81
“For practical purposes,” explains Greenspan,
a military occupation may be divided into two phases. The first is the
combat or wake-of-battle phase, which begins as soon as the area comes
into control of the occupying or liberating force . . . . The second, or
occupational, phase occurs when the tide of battle has receded well
beyond the occupied territory, conditions there are fairly well settled, and
administration becomes the main problem rather than battle. 287
Typically, then, belligerent occupation is a stage of the general hostilities that reflects the
fact that the phase of intense warfare is over and has finished in the belligerently
occupied territory. 288 This is “a period of time when the military phase of active
hostilities has passed from the occupied territory and when the occupant attempts to
establish an orderly administration,” explains von Glahn. 289 “In positive terms, and
broadly stated,” writes Julius Stone, “the Occupant’s powers are . . . to continue orderly
government . . . [and] to exercise control over and utilize the resources of the country so
far as necessary for that purpose and to meet his own military needs.”290 What in essence
occurs, clarifies Oppenheim, is that “the legitimate Government is prevented from
exercising its authority,” and it is therefore the occupying power that “actually exercises”
it. 291 The occupant accordingly “acquires a temporary right of administration over the
territory and its inhabitants . . . .”292 Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides the
foundation for this power and responsibility, prescribing that the occup ying power “shall
take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order
and safety . . . .”293 The 2004 Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict of the United
Kingdom repeats this prescription in almost identical fashion294 and then continues and
explains that the occupying authority moreover “is responsible for the orderly
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government of the territory.”295 Thus as a practical result “[w]here hostile territory is
occupied,” elucidates Morris Greenspan,
all functions of the enemy government—legislative, executive, or
administrative; general, provincial, or local—cease, or continue only with
the sanction, express or implied, of the occupant. In their place the invader
sets up his own administration. No matter what name he applies to his
government, whether it is termed military or civil, the circumstances in
which it arose alone determine its true nature and as a military occupant he
is bound by the relevant rules of international law. 296
¶82

Accordingly, when Israel entered the disputed territories in 1967, international law
obligated it to assume and execute all the tasks of an administrative nature that Jordan
was unable to fulfill, as Israel was the authority in actual control of the territory. Yet,
writes Oppenheim:
[T]he administration of the occupant is in no wise [sic] to be compared
with ordinary administration, for it is distinctly and precisely military
administration. In carrying it out the occupant is totally independent of the
constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of
warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces and the purpose of
war, stand in the foreground of his interest, and must be promoted under
all circumstances and conditions . . . . [A]s regards the safety of his army
and the purpose of war the occupant is vested with an almost absolute
power . . . . [H]e must ensure public order and safety . . . .297

¶83

To illustrate this aspect of military administration it may be instructive to turn to
the World War II U.S. administration in Germany. In April 1945 the Combined Joint
Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to the Commanding General of the United States
occupation forces in Germany, General Dwight Eisenhower, to guide him concerning the
legal obligations and rights of the administration of military government of the United
States in occupied Germany. The directive stipulated, among other things, that
you are, by virtue of your position, clothed with supreme legislative,
executive, and judicial authority in the areas occupied by forces under
your command. This authority will be broadly construed and includes
authority to take all measures deemed by you necessary, appropriate or
desirable in relation to military exigencies and the objectives of a firm
military government. 298
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¶84

As a matter of fact, “a decision had been reached at the highest Allied levels (Yalta
Conference),” von Glahn points out, “that the occupying powers would have authority
greater than the traditional ‘military occupant’ possessed,” and the anticipated length of
Allied occupation of Germany was at the time “always discussed in terms of decades.” 299
¶85
Listed among the basic objectives of military government in occupied Germany
was the directive that
The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again
becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Essential steps in the
accomplishment of this objective are the elimination of Nazism and
militarism in all their forms, the immediate apprehe nsion of war criminals
for punishment, the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of
Germany, with continuing control over Germany’s capacity to make war,
and the preparation for an eventual reconstruction of German political life
on a democratic basis. 300
Parenthetically, the Japanese surrender instruments and the July 26, 1945 Potsdam
Proclamation also granted the Allies occupation powers beyond those of the Hague
Regulations. 301
¶86
Israel’s assumption of Jordan’s former responsibilities, obligations, and authority
was thus pursuant to the requirements of international law, which bestows on the
occupant the competence to manage the occupied area in place of the previous
administration so as to avert vacuity in public order maintenance and in the effective
management of daily life in the occupied area. As former Chief Justice of the Israel
Supreme Court Meir Shamgar opines, “[t]he first and foremost aim of the Israel Military
Government” in the territories that came under the control of Israel as the result of
actions engaged in self-defense during a war waged against it by Arab States in June
1967
was the restoration and maintenance of public order and safety . . . . The
entry of Israeli military forces into the areas under consideration accorded
to them the right and duty to establish an orderly and just administration.
This was not regarded merely as an aim of warfare, or as a means for the
maintenance and safety of the military forces, but as the consequence of
their duty to be guided in every situation, including military
administration, by the rule of law . . . . 302
Chief Justice Shamgar continues and explains that

bears mention that this directive dealt with the policies concerning the initial post-war phase in Germany.
299
VON GLAHN, supra note 164, at 276 (emphasis added).
300
DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF UNITED STATES FORCES OF OCCUPATION REGARDING THE
M ILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY, supra note 298, para. 4(c).
301
VON GLAHN, supra note 164, at 286.
302
Shamgar, supra note 209, at 43.
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[t]he establishment of military government was the direct result of the
armed conflict and of the entry of Israeli armed forces into areas in which
the former governments, whatever their legal standing, were prevented
from exercising their authority. According to International Law the
exercise of the right of military administration over the territory and its
inhabitants had no time- limit, because it reflected a factual situation and
pending an alternative political or military solution this system of
government could, from the legal point of view, continue indefinitely. 303
¶87

The humanitarian and military necessity considerations and ramifications during
belligerent occupation are typically considered to be different from those during battle, as
usually actual combat has either moved on to other places or has ended altogether. 304
However, belligerent occupation is in essence but “a phase of war as yet undecided,”
writes von Glahn, and is “a temporary phenomenon, subject to the changing fortunes of
the conflict . . . .” 305 It is a “precarious” phenomenon, explains Feilchenfeld, in that
international law takes “cognizance of that kind of precariousness which results from the
fact that a war is still going on . . . . The territorial change of belligerent occupation . . . is
treated as precarious as long as the war continues.”306 A fluid, uncertain situation can
exist, vacillating between all-out war and the relative calm of administration of occupied
territory. 307 Because “any part of a territory controlled by a belligerent is a potential
fighting zone,” concludes Georg Schwarzenberger, “the distinction between fighting
zones, occupied enemy territories and unoccupied territories of belligerents is becoming
increasingly blurred, and all these areas tend to merge into potential fighting zones.”308
Following World War I’s armistice of November 11, 1918, during the Allied occupation
of the Rhineland, for instance, the Allies undertook various military measures in the
occupied territory in anticipation that the war might erupt again. 309 One observer in fact
termed the Rhineland occupation as a “continuing war.”310 Consequently, even during a
period of relative calm in occupied territories, military operations, taken in anticipation of
the threat of terrorism, may be necessary at times, thereby blurring the distinction
between the occupying power’s authority during active warfare and its powers in calm
periods. 311 Not only during actual warfare is military necessity of vital importance; it may
be crucial also in occupied territory in order to pre-empt material danger. 312
303

Id. As Greenspan points out, “[a] military occupation . . . may continue over a lengthy period of
time.” GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 266 n.181 (emphasis added); see also VON GLAHN, supra note 164,
at 276.
304
See M CDOUGAL & FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF W AR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND
W ORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 245, at 739-40; M CDOUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND M INIMUM W ORLD
PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 288, at 739-40; see also GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 214; VON GLAHN, supra
note 164, at 226.
305
VON GLAHN, supra note 164, at 273 (emphasis added); see also FEILCHENFELD, supra note 84, at 4,
7.
306
FEILCHENFELD, supra note 84, at 5 (emphasis added).
307
Cf. VON GLAHN, supra note 164, at 275.
308
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 81, at 314–15.
309
See FRAENKEL , supra note 88, at 9.
310
Id. at 107.
311
See, e.g., Ayoub, supra note 163, at 131 (Landau, J.) .
312
See, e.g., id. at 117 (Witkon, J.); see also Hilu, supra note 163, at 178 (Landau, J.); Ayoub, supra
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¶88

The Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff thus, for example, specifically authorized a
very broad implementation of military necessity in an occupation setting when they
issued a directive in April 1945 to General Dwight Eisenhower, it will be recalled, to
assist him with respect to the legal rights and obligations concerning the United States’
military government administration in occupied Germany. The directive, in considering
the basis of military government, dictated, to reiterate, that General Eisenhower was due
to his position vested “with supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority in the
areas occupied by forces under [his] command” and that this authority was to “be broadly
construed and includes authority to take all measures deemed by [him] necessary,
appropriate or desirable in relation to military exigencies and the objectives of a firm
military government.”313
¶89
Over 22,400 terrorist attacks have been carried out against Israelis over the past
five years. 314 These attacks, executed by suicide bombings, mortars, missiles, car bombs,
machine guns, hand grenades, mines, petrol bombs, and rockets on villages, towns, and
cities, as well as countless shooting incidents, have inflicted well over 8600 casualties,
killing more than 1070 people since September 2000. 315 This situation, as explained
note 163, at 131 (Landau, J.).
313
DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF UNITED STATES FORCES OF OCCUPATION REGARDING THE
M ILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY, supra note 298 (emphasis added). While this directive, as
previously pointed out, dealt with the policies concerning the initial post-war phase in Germany [id.], it did
not indicate how long that period would last. Such a determination in April 1945, when the directive was
first issued, would certainly have been difficult if not impossible to establish. Also, even though the
directive “[a]s such . . . [was] not intended to be an ultimate statement of policies” of the United States
concerning Germany’s post-war treatment [id.], this is not reason enough to assume that such measures as
contemplated in the directive would not have been potentially necessary beyond the initial period.
314
See Total of Attacks, supra note 110.
315
See Casualties Since 29.09.2000, supra note 113. The vast majority of these casualties have been
civilians. See id. It will be recalled that “[a] military occupation involves a relationship between the
occupant and the inhabitants which may continue over a lengthy period of time. The object of the laws of
war on military occupation is to assure a modus vivendi between the occupant and the inhabitants
compatible with the state of war . . . .” GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 266 n.181 (emphasis added). The
laws of war thus require the occupying authority to “do all in [its] power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety” in the occupied area, “a duty which certainly operates as much for the
benefit of the inhabitants as it does for the occupant.” Id. Consequently, concludes Greenspan, “[i]t would
be difficult to argue that this duty on the part of the occupant does not imply a corresponding duty on the
part of the general inhabitants to refrain from acts which would interfere with public order and safety. To
hold otherwise would be to claim that while the occupant was under a duty to ensure public order, the
population was free to keep the territory in a turmoil.” Id.
International law thus demands a parallel reciprocal duty of the inhabitants of the occupied areas to
the occupant’s authority and obligation to ensure public order and safety. Stated simply, the inhabitants
owe to the occupying authority an obligation of obedience as is required for the security of the occupant’s
forces, ensuring law and order, and administering the area in an appropriate fashion. “In practice,” explains
Greenspan, “this means that the inhabitants must give, and the occupant can enforce, an obedience which is
essentially the same as that which they gave to the preexisting legitimate government . . . .” Id. at 264. The
civilians in the occupied areas must “behave peaceably, carry on their normal pursuits as far as possible,
take no part in the hostilities, refrain from all injurious acts toward the troops of the occupant or their
operations, and generally render strict obedience to the occupant’s officials.” Id. at 265 (emphasis added);
see U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY supra note 247, para. 432; see also U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE
M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 11.15.1.
Certain specific, fundamental conditions must exist for inhabitants of occupied areas to be
recognized as lawful combatants, and if they take part in hostilities without having fulfilled these essential
conditions, they have no right to be treated as lawful belligerents. Article 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949 has “conferred the status of lawful combatants on members of organized resistance
movements belonging to a party to the conflict who operate in or outside their own territory, even if this
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earlier, has created a legal position that might best be categorized as an “armed conflict
short of war.”316 As a result, it would be difficult to contend that the basic premise of
belligerent occupation is always present in the disputed territories—that of the
termination of intense combat in the belligerently occupied territory. 317 The attacks that
Palestinian terrorists, operating from within the disputed territories, have been carrying
out against Israel and Israelis are of such an extent and magnitude for Israel that their
scale renders them to be tantamount to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States, that, according to President Bush “created a state of armed conflict that requires
the use of the United States Armed Forces.”318 To be more exact, in light of the number of
casualties that Israel has suffered from terrorist attacks over the last five years, relative to
its populaton, it actually would be as if “September 11, 2001” had occurred a total of
some 104 times against Israel and Israelis since the year 2000.
¶90
The military situation of Israel in the disputed territories could thus be compared to
that confronting the coalition forces in Iraq in the sense that “a state of armed conflict and
a state of occupation”319 concomitantly exist. Consequently, the laws of warfare and of
belligerent occupation are concurrently applicable. As Col. Marc Warren, staff judge
advocate for Combined Joint Task Force 7, the U.S. military operation in Iraq, explained
in August 2003, “[o]ur soldiers are conducting combat operations” and they “are still
engaged in combat operatio ns,”320 notwithstanding President George W. Bush’s
declaration more than three months earlier, on May 1, 2003, that major combat operations
territory is occupied, provided they fulfill the four conditions of being commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates, of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, of carrying arms openly,
and of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.” GREENSPAN, supra
note 261, at 266 (emphasis added); Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
art. 4(A) (1949), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm.
Thus, if inhabitants of occupied areas do not fulfill these crucial and indispensable criteria, they
“have no right in law to engage in hostilities against the occupying power.” GREENSPAN, supra note 261,
at 265 n.181 (emphasis added). Consequently, “[o]ffenses committed by the inhabitants in violation of
these obligations are punishable by the occupying power.” Id. at 265. As the 2004 Manual of the Law of
Armed Conflict of the United Kingdom explains, “[o]nly combatants have the right to participate directly
in hostilities. If civilians take a direct part in hostilities without satisfying the conditions under which they
acquire lawful combatant status, they are not entitled to be treated as belligerents and may be punished by
the occupying power.” U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT ,
supra note 122, para. 11.14 (emphasis added). For instance, paramilitary forces, or partisans “acting on
their own initiative” do not comply with the requirement “that an armed force should be under a command
responsible to a party to the conflict for the conduct of its subordinates.” Id. para. 4.3.3. Moreover, “[a]ny
force, group, or unit which in the course of its operations systematically fails to [comply with the law of
armed conflict] runs the risk of being regarded as not being subject to an effective disciplinary system and
therefore not being a legally recognizable armed force under international law. The members of such a
force would not be entitled to combatant status . . . .” Id. para. 4.3.4. There were, however, some cases
tried before courts in the aftermath of World War II—in the Netherlands for example—that nonetheless
ruled that there was no obligation for civilians under occupation to abstain from engaging in aggressive
behavior against the occupation forces and occupant itself. See GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 265 n.181.
316
See the interview conducted with Col. Daniel Reisner [see supra note 191], appearing in Wilkinson,
supra note 191.
317
Cf. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF W AR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND W ORLD PUBLIC ORDER,
supra note 245, at 740; M CDOUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND M INIMUM W ORLD PUBLIC ORDER, at 740.
318
President Issues Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, supra note 198 (emphasis added); Elsea, supra note 198.
319
Interview by Human Rights Watch with Col. Marc Warren, Col. Mike Kelly, and Major P.J. Perrone,
Baghdad, Iraq (Sept. 23, 2003), appearing in Hearts and Minds, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
320
Vivienne Walt, Iraqis Seek Retribution for Civilian Casualties, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 9, 2003,
available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/special/iraq/2038968 (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
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in Iraq were over. Hostilities have not yet ceased, points out Col. Warren. 321 As for “the
Israeli/Palestinian conflict,” explains Kenneth Watkins, “it is widely recognized that
international humanitarian law applies in the occupied territories. As a result, in addition
to the provisions protecting persons in occupied territories found in the 1907 Hague
Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, the rules on the methods and means of
warfare will be applicable. International humanitarian law would therefore govern the use
of force relating to the conduct of hostilities.”322 B.D. Tittemore further elucidates this
concurrent application of international norms relevant to both a state of occupation as
well as a state of armed conflict: “An occupation of the territory of one state by the armed
forces of another also triggers the rules of international armed conflict, as well as specific
rules regarding the administration of an occupied territory by an occupier.”323
VIII.
¶91

PROPERTY AND ITS SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION

It is regrettable that military operations during a war will most certainly be
accompanied by the seizure and destruction of both private as well as public property.
Though as Georg Schwarzenberger writes, “to expect property in occupied countries to
enjoy the same protection as foreign nationals are entitled to claim in time of peace
would impose more severe restrictions on a belligerent occupant than wartime
circumstances make feasible.”324 The provisions in the Hague Regulations regarding
seizure and requisition of private property, continues Schwarzenberger,
are evidence of a desire to assimilate requisition and seizure of private
property in occupied territories to expropriation in time of peace. In the
nature of things, even the Hague Regulations fall short of peacetime
requirements. They are, however, intended to approximate to these
standards at least as far as wartime circumstances permit. 325

Consequently, he concludes, “requisition and seizure under the law of belligerent
occupation may be viewed as the counterparts to lawful expropriation under the law of
peace.”326
¶92
“The guiding principle governing the treatment of enemy property in warfare,”
explains Greenspan, is “stated in Article 23 . . . of the Hague Regulations . . . which
forbids the destruction or seizure of enemy property, except where ‘imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war.’”327 Hence, explains Greenspan, “[w]here the
321

See Lisa Burgess, Different Iraqi Prisoners Have Different Legal Rights, STARS AND STRIPES, Aug.
6, 2003, available at http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=16235&archive=true (last
visited Nov. 20, 2005)
322
Watkin, supra note 204, at 28.
323
Brian D. Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to
United Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN . J. INT ’L L. 61, 66-67 (1997).
324
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 81, at 243.
325
Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
326
Id. at 272. Usually, however, “seizure is surrounded by fewer safeguards in favour of the private
owner than requisition.” Id. at 291.
327
GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 278 (e mphasis added); see U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY supra note 247,
para. 58; U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122,
para. 11.75. For the damage to be permissible
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operations of war render it imperatively necessary, enemy property, public or private,
may be seized or destroyed.”328 He continues to elucidate further concerning the
permissible seizure or destruction of enemy property when “imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war”:
The imperative necessities of military operations justify the use or damage
of enemy private property, real or personal, and neither rent for its use nor
compensation for its damage may be claimed . . . . Buildings, fences,
woods, and crops may be demolished, cut down or removed to clear a field
of fire, to provide material for the construction of bridges and other
military works, or to furnish fuel, where required by imperative military
necessity. 329
¶93

In the language of paragraph 11.78 of the 2004 Manual of the Law of Armed
Conflict of the United Kingdom,
[l]and and buildings may be used temporarily for the needs of the
occupying power, even if that use impairs its value. Military use would
include, for example, use for . . . construction of defensive positions . . . .
If necessary, houses, fences, and woods may be cleared to open up a field
of fire or the materials used for bridges, roads, or fuel imperatively needed
by the occupying forces. The owner of property used in this way may
claim neither rent nor compensation . . . . 330

¶94

Discussing specifically the necessity required to justify the destruction or seizure of
property under Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations, von Glahn points out that “the
necessity has to be very urgent and vital.”331 Within the context of the armed conflict
between Palestinians and Israel, a security barrier, though it entails the seizure or
destruction of some property in the course of its construction, clearly is “very urgent and
vital” to the security of Israel and the safety of its citizens, a necessity which thereby
justifies property seizure or destruction for this purpose. “[A] real emergency,” to borrow
the words of von Glahn, has forced “an occupant to destroy public or private property.”332
In this particular instance of building a security barrier, and under the circumstances of
[t]here must be some reasonably close connection between the destruction of property and the
overcoming of the enemy’s army. Thus the rule requiring respect for private property is not
violated through damage resulting from operations, movements, or combat activity of the army;
that is, real estate may be used for marches, camp sites, construction of field fortifications,
etc. . . . Fences, woods, crops, buildings, etc., may be demolished, cut down, and removed to
clear a field of fire, to clear the ground for landing fields, or to furnish building materials or fuel
if imperatively needed for the army.
U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, supra note 247, para. 56 (emphasis added).
328
Id. at 281 (emphasis added). As Schwarzenberger explains, “[s]eizure in a combat area is a right of
user [sic] of the property in question to any extent, including destruction, that the necessities of war may
make advisable.” SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 81, at 293.
329
GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 283 (emphasis added).
330
U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , supra note 122, para. 11.78 (emphasis added).
331
VON GLAHN, supra note 164, at 227.
332
Id.
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incessant terror attack against Israel and Israelis, “destruction of property is legitimate”
because, to again borrow from von Glahn, “the evidence shows that necessity existed
logically under then prevailing conditions.”333
¶95
Beyond its clear application in those instances “where imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war,” Article 23(g) is also considered by scholars to be applicable
“directly to all territories under a belligerent’s control or, at least, to fighting zones and
occupied territories.”334 The authoritative and internationally acclaimed commentator on
the Geneva Conventions, Jean Pictet, for instance, concludes that since Article 23(g) “is
placed in the section [of the Hague Regulations] entitled ‘hostilities’, it covers all
property in the territory involved in a war . . . .”335 This article is therefore indeed
relevant when it comes to considering the legality of seizing land in occupied territory. 336
Hence, explains Georg Schwarzenberger, “a case . . . can be made for the direct
application of Article 23(g) to all territories under the control of belligerents.”337 If the
rule contained in Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations “applies directly to fighting
zones alo ne,” he continues, “it can be legitimately extended by analogy to occupied
territories.”338 Schwarzenberger elaborates:
[A]ny part of a territory controlled by a belligerent is a potential fighting
zone. Thus, contrary to the typical situation as it existed in 1899 and 1907,
the distinction between fighting zones, occupied enemy territories and
unoccupied territories of belligerents is becoming increasingly blurred,
and all these areas tend to merge into potential fighting zones. 339
¶96

Article 23(g) may thus be regarded as being applicable not only during actual
combat but within occupied territory as well as in times of suppressing hostile
activities. 340 Consequently, as the British Manual of Military Law concludes, Article
23(g) “applies to both occupied and unoccupied territory.”341
333

Id. at 228.
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 81, at 314. In spite of this, writes Schwarzenberger, “[i]t would be
difficult to square either variant with the intention of the Parties to the Hague Conventions.” Id.
335
PICTET , supra note 165, at 301 (emphasis added).
336
See, e.g., Beit Sourik Village Council, supra note 106.
337
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 81, at 314 (emphasis added). Yet, writes Schwarzenberger, this is
“hardly one based on the intention of the Parties to the Hague Conventions . . . .” Id.
338
Id. at 253; see id. at 257.
339
Id. at 314–15 (emphasis added).
340
See, e.g., Hilu, supra note 163, at 178; Gusen, supra note 184.
341
THE WAR OFFICE [UK], THE LAW OF W AR ON LAND BEING PART III OF THE M ANUAL OF MILITARY
LAW 163, para. 588, cmt. 1 (1958) [hereinafter M ANUAL OF MILITARY LAW ](emphasis added); see also
U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 11.75.
THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND BEING PART III OF THE M ANUAL OF M ILITARY LAW , written by Hersch
Lauterpact and assisted in this task by Gerald Draper, was “regarded internationally as a classic text on its
subject.” U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, at
vii.
Interestingly, and notwithstanding the conclusion reached in the Report of the Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories
Occupied by Israel Since 1967 to the effect that Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations is indeed relevant
to the consideration of the legality of the Israeli security barrier [cited in Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 9 (separate opinion of Judge
Higgins)], the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the Israeli security barrier declared
334
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¶97

Specifically concerning the destruction of enemy property in occupied territory,
though, Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention permits occupying forces to carry
out such destruction of property situated in occupied territory if “rendered absolutely
necessary by military operations.” 342 The U.S. Army Field Manual on The Law of Land
Warfare reiterates this rule in a similar fashion, 343 as does the 2004 British Manual of the
Law of Armed Conflict.344
¶98
Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention thus reinforces the rule embodied in
Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations, 345 thereby making Article 53 in essence a
rewording of the rule expressed in Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations. Article 53,
explains Greenspan, “is, in effect, a restatement, with particular reference to occupied
territories, of the general principle contained in Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations,
1907, which is applicable to warfare in all its aspects”346 and allows the seizure as well
as the destruction of enemy property when “imperatively demanded by the necessities of
war.”347 Moreover, according to Schwarzenberger, “Article 53 must be read together with
the general reservations contained in Article 64(2)”—that is, Article 53 must be read
together with the following: the occupying authority may
subject the population of the occupied territory to [penal] provisions which
are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under
the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the
territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the
members and property of the occupying forces or administration”348

that “Article 23 (g) of the Regulations, in Section II, is . . . not pertinent” to the determination of the
security barrier’s legality. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, supra note 9, sec. 124.
342
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 53 (emphasis added); see also id. art. 46; U.S. DEP ’T OF
THE A RMY, supra note 247, para. 285; U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED
CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 9.36.
343
U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, supra note 247, para. 393.
344
U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para.
11.75; see The Hostages Trial, Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, supra note 216, at 66; see also U.K.
M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 2.2.3.
Interestingly, without investigating or analyzing the legality of Israel’s security barrier in depth and without
explaining upon what evidence it based its findings, the International Court of Justice simply concludes that
“on the material before it, the Court is not convinced that the destructions carried out contrary to the
prohibition in Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention were rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations.” Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra
note 9, sec. 135. . This despite the fact, as mentioned in an earlier context, that according to Paragraph
11.78 of the British 2004 M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , “[l]and and buildings may be used
temporarily for the needs of the occupying power, even if that use impairs its value. Military use would
include, for example, use for . . . construction of defensive positions. . . . If necessary, houses, fences, and
woods may be cleared to open up a field of fire or the materials used for bridges, roads, or fuel imperatively
needed by the occupying forces. The owner of property used in this way may claim neither rent nor
compensation . . . .” U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , supra note 122, , para. 11.78 (emphasis added).
345
See M ANUAL OF MILITARY LAW supra note 341, at 163, para. 588; see also U.K. M INISTRY OF
DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 11.75 n. 129.
346
GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 287 (emphasis added).
347
See id. at 278, 287 (emphasis added).
348
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, at art. 64, para. 2 (emphasis added); see U.K. M INISTRY OF
DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 57. This means,
according to Jean Pictet, that the occupying authority is
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—with the result being that “the exception clause in Article 53 is less narrow than, on the
surface, appears,”349 points out Schwarzenberger. In fact, as the tribunal in the Hostages
Case held, military necessity generally “sanctions measures by an occupant necessary to
protect the safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his operations.” 350
¶99
It will be pertinent to recall at this point that, as Greenspan writes, “‘[t]he question
in what circumstances a necessity arises cannot be decided by any hard-and- fast rule.’”351
In order to determine if indeed the destruction was permissible, he continues, “[t]he
situation should be judged as it appeared at the time to the commander who made the
decision, and not as the facts are viewed in retrospect.”352 Pictet, as well, explains that “it
will be for the Occupying Power to judge the importance of such military requirements”
as will justify the destruction of private or public property in occupied territory:
The prohibition of destruction of property situated in occupied territory is
subject to an important reservation: it does not apply in cases “where such
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.” The
occupying forces may therefore undertake the total or partial destruction
of certain private or public property in the occupied territory when
imperative military requirements so demand. Furthermore, it will be for
the Occupying Power to judge the importance of such military
requirements. . . . The Occupying Power must . . . try to interpret the
clause in a reasonable manner: whenever it is felt essential to resort to
destruction, the occupying authorities must try to keep a sense of
proportion in comparing the military advantages to be gained with the
damage done.353
¶100

Pictet further elucidates that post-World War II courts held admissible in specific
instances tactics that included “recourse to a ‘scorched earth’ policy, i.e. the systematic
destruction of whole areas by occupying forces withdrawing before the enemy,” when
required by military considerations and “carried out in exceptional circumstances purely
for legitimate military reasons.” These same court decisions, though, rebuked “wanton
destruction” or “extensive destruction” and “severely condemned recourse to measures of
authorized to promulgate penal provisions for its own protection. This power has long been
recognized by international law. The provision is sufficiently comprehensive to cover all
civilian and military organizations which an Occupying Power normally maintains in occupied
territory. The Convention mentions ‘the Occupying Power’ itself besides referring to the
members and property of the occupying forces or administration, so that general activities such
as activities on behalf of enemy armed forces are covered. The Occupying Power is entitled to
use establishments and lines of communication for its own needs; it is therefore entitled to take
appropriate measures to ensure their security.
PICTET , supra note 165, at 337 (emphasis added). Thus, “[t]he occupying power can create punishable
offences in the interests of its security or that of the population in the occupied territory.” U.K. M INISTRY
OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 11.15 (emphasis
added); see also id., para. 11.57.
349
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 81, at 315.
350
The Hostages Trial, Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, supra note 216, at 66.
351
GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 285 (quoting BRITISH M ANUAL OF MILITARY LAW , supra note 341, at
chap. xiv, para. 434).
352
GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 286 n.37.
353
PICTET , supra note 165, at 302 (emphasis added).
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general devastation whenever they were wanton, excessive or not warranted by military
operations.” 354 As Pictet explains:
Article 6(b) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal describes
“the wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation not
justified by military necessity” as a war crime. Moreover, Article 147 of
the Fourth Convention includes among the “grave breaches” liable to
penal sanctions under Article 146, “extensive destruction . . . of property,
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly.”355
¶101

Consequently, concludes Greenspan, “among the war crimes defined by Art. 6(b)
of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 1945, is ‘devastation not justified by
military necessity,’ which obviously implies that devastation is justified by military
necessity.”356 The Hostages Case in fact actually held that a general devastation could
indeed be justified by urgent military necessity. 357
¶102
Thus, “[t]he accepted opinion appears to be that, ‘general devastation of enemy
territory is, as a rule, absolutely prohibited, and only permitted very exceptionally, when
“it is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war” [Hague Regulations, 23 (g)]
[sic].’”358 Furthermore, in detailing the rights the occupying power has to dispose of
private and public property, 359 Pictet notes:
[T]he prohibition only refers to “destruction.” Under international law the
occupying authorities have a recognized right, under certain
circumstances, to dispose of property within the occupied territory—
namely the right to requisition private property . . . and the right to

354

Id.
Id. (emphasis added). “Wanton destruction and seizure,” explains Greenspan, “may be distinguished
from that wh ich is necessary by the gross disparity between the extent of the destruction and seizure and
any valid reason for it. A belligerent is liable to pay compensation for the destruction and seizure of
property not justified by the imperative necessities of war . . . .” GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 280
(emphasis added).
356
GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 286– 87 n.37 (emphasis added).
357
The Hostages Trial, Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, supra note 216, at 66; see GREENSPAN, supra
note 261, at 286 n.37; U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra
note 122, para. 2.2.3.
358
GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 285. Paragraph 56 of THE LAW OF LAND W ARFARE describes the
amount of permissible damage in the following manner: “The measure of permissible devastation is found
in the strict necessities of war. Devastation as an end in itself or as a separate measure of war is not
sanctioned by the law of war. There must be some reasonably close connection between the destruction of
property and the overcoming of the enemy’s army .” U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, THE LAW OF LAND
W ARFARE , supra note 247, para. 56 (emphasis added).
359
As to public land, see Hague Regulations, supra note 168, art.55 (1907), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm; U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, THE LAW OF LAND
W ARFARE , supra note 247, para. 400; see also VON GLAHN, supra note 164, at 179, 180; GREENSPAN,
supra note 261, at 287-88, 292; U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, THE LAW OF LAND W ARFARE , supra note 247,
paras. 394(c), 400, 401, 402; FEILCHENFELD , supra note 84, at 55; U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE
M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, paras. 11.86, 11.75, 2.2.3.
355
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administer and enjoy the use of real property belonging to the occupied
State.360
¶103

Article 46 of the Hague Regulations indeed stipulates that “private property . . .
must be respected” and “cannot be confiscated.”361 Yet, this article is also subject to rules
of international law enabling the occupying power, for reasons either of public welfare or
military necessity, to make use of private property or to limit the owners’ use of it.
Accordingly, an exception under Article 46 is the expropriation of privately owned land,
according to local law procedures, to meet public needs. “During an occupation,”
Feilchenfeld points out, “the occupant’s right and duty to maintain public order and
safety may involve expropriation. As measures for the benefit of the occupied country
they differ, of course, from requisitions.”362 He explains that Article 46’s rule against
prohibiting the confiscation of private property does not afford protection “against losses
incurred through lawful requisitions, contributions, seizures . . . and expropriation.”363
Thus, although Paragraph 406 of the U.S. Army Field Manual The Law of Land Warfare
indicates in identical fashion as the Hague Regulations’ Article 46 that “[p]rivate
property cannot be confiscated,”364 and the subsequent Paragraph 407 stipulates that
“[i]mmovable private enemy property may under no circumstances be seized,”365 that
same Paragraph 407 also provides that enemy property “may, however, be
requisitioned . . . .” 366 As the United Kingdom’s 2004 Manual of the Law of Armed
Conflict explains, “[t]he requirement to respect private property is subject to conditions
necessitated by armed conflict. For example, military operations inevitably cause damage
to private property and occupying forces are entitled to requisition property for necessary
military purposes.”367 Oppenheim explains:
Article 46 of the Hague Regulations expressly enacts that “private
property may not be confiscated.” But confiscation differs from the
temporary use of private land and buildings for all kinds of purposes
demanded by the necessities of war. What has been said above with regard
to utilisation of public buildings applies equally to private buildings. If
necessary, they may be converted into hospitals, barracks, and stables
without compensation for the proprietors, and they may also be converted
into fortifications. 368

360

PICTET , supra note 165, at 301 (emphasis added).
Hague Regulations, supra note 168, art. 46.
362
FEILCHENFELD, supra note 84, at 50 (emphasis added). “[P]rivate property of enemy aliens found
within the territory of a belligerent,” as well, “may be subjected to control during hostilities,” according to
Greenspan. GREENSPAN , supra note 261, at 48-49.
363
FEILCHENFELD, supra note 84, at 51 (emphasis added).
364
U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, THE LAW OF LAND W ARFARE , supra note 247, para. 406 (emphasis
added).
365
Id. para. 407.
366
Id. (emphasis added).
367
U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para.
11.76.2 (emphasis added).
368
OPPENHEIM , supra note 192, at 403-04.
361
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¶104

As the Romanian-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal decided in Goldenberg & Sons
v. Germany, “military requisition is a form sui generis of expropriation for purposes of
public utility. The latter is an accepted exception to the principle of the respect for private
property. It is the same with requisition . . . .”369 Thus, explains Greenspan, although
absolute confiscation is at all times forbidden, the obligation to show consideration for
private property may not hamper various military operations regarding it, nor the
requisitioning of various private property. 370 Privately-owned land may temporarily be
utilized for objectives necessitated by the demands of war, notwithstanding that the
property may be damaged or its value lowered due to this use. The owners ma y claim
neither reimbursement for any damage that has accrued thereby or rent for its use. 371
Nevertheless, Israel has offered to pay Palestinian landowners whose property is required
for the security barrier a base fee and a yearly sum for requisitioning their property. 372
¶105
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations 373 also allows for the expropriation of property
for the objective of preserving and maintaining public order and safety. 374 An occupier in
fact is actually required under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations to “take all the
measures” in its power to “ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,”375 and
seizure of property undoubtedly could be included among these measures. 376
¶106
Article 52 of the Hague Regulations provides that requisitions may be demanded
from inhabitants for the needs of the occupation forces. 377 “Requisition may . . . be
described as an act of State,” writes Schwarzenberger, “authorised on conditions laid
down by international law, by which a belligerent occupant may deprive a private person
or local authority of ownership in mo vables and possession in immovables.”378 Because
“the wording of Article 52,” he points out, “is sufficiently wide to include
immovables,”379 clearly “a belligerent occupant may deprive a private person or local
authority of . . . possession in immovables.”380
¶107
Von Glahn, as well, explains that temporary use of land is permissible when there
is military necessity for it: “Under normal circumstances an occupant may not
appropriate or seize on a permanent basis any immovable private property, but on the
369

Goldenberg et Fils v. Germany (Rom. v. Germ.), 2 R.I.A.A. 901, 909 (1928) (in French).
See GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 294.
371
See id. at 295. Practically, though, in order to alleviate suffering, rent is indeed frequently paid to the
landowners in these types of cases. See id.
372
See A Temporary Measure, supra note 132.
373
Hague Regulations, supra note 168, art. 43.
374
See The Krupp Trial, Trial of Alfred Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and Eleven Others,
X LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 135 (1949); GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 296.
375
Hague Regulations, supra note 168, art. 43 (emphasis added); see also GREENSPAN, supra note 261,
at 295.
376
See, e.g., Ayoub, supra note 163, at 130–31 (Landau, J.); GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 296.
377
See Hague Regulations, supra note 168, art. 52. The United States Army Field Manual in Paragraph
412 repeats this principle and then goes on to explain what types of items may be requisitioned:
“Practically everything may be requisitioned under this article that is necessary for the maintenance of the
army, such as fuel, food, clothing, building materials, machinery, tools, vehicles, furnishings for quarters,
etc. Billeting of troops in occupied areas is also authorized.” U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, THE LAW OF LAND
W ARFARE , supra note 247, para. 412 (emphasis added).
378
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 81, at 288.
379
Id. at 269.
380
Id. at 288 (emphasis added); see also id. at 246, 276, 282. “[R]equisition and seizure under the law
of belligerent occupation,” as mentioned earlier, “may be viewed as the counterparts to lawful
expropriation under the law of peace.” Id. at 272.
370
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other hand a temporary use of land and buildings for various purposes appears
permissible under a plea of military necessity.”381 Undoubtedly, then, a security barrier
would be one of the “various purposes” permitted for the “military necessity” of
defending Israel and Israelis against deadly terrorist attacks. “Land and buildings may be
used temporarily for the needs of the occupying power,” explains Paragraph 11.78 of the
2004 British Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, as mentioned earlier, and “[m]ilitary
use would include, for example, use for . . . construction of defensive positions . . . .”382
¶108
The use of property seized on grounds of military necessity in accordance with
Article 52 of the Hague Regulations requires payment of compensation. Hence Israel, as
mentioned earlier, offers property owners a yearly rent (usage fee) for the duration of the
time during which the barrier will be standing on their property. This is in accord with the
general practice in occupied territories, since as Feilchenfeld points out, “almost
invariably the occupant merely takes possession and pays for using the land.”383 It is
important to reiterate that Israel’s barrier is a temporary measure 384 that can be dismantled
when the security situation allows. 385 It is in fact physically designed to be taken down
quickly and easily under the appropriate security conditions. “[W]hen the terrorist threat
has ceased,” Israel expects “that the fence will be moved to reflect any agreement
between the two sides. Israel is fully committed to doing so. It has moved such fences
before – on its borders with Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon in the context of peace
agreements or other arrangements.”386 As Israel Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom further
reiterates, once a peace agreement with the Palestinians is finally achieved, the security
barrier will be moved, “just as the fence between Israel and Egypt was moved in the
aftermath of a peace accord, the fence between Israel and Jordan was moved following a
peace agreement, and the fence between Israel and Lebanon was moved following
Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon.”387 The President of Israel, Moshe Katzav, as well, has
381

VON GLAHN, supra note 164, at 186 (emphasis added).
U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para.
11.78 (emphasis added). To the International Court of Justice, however, it simply appears “from the
information submitted to [it] . . . that the construction of the wall has led to the destruction or requisition of
properties under conditions which contravene the requirements of Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague
Regulations of 1907 and of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.” Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 9, sec. 132.
383
FEILCHENFELD, supra note 84, at 38.
384
See Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al.,
supra note 14, paras. 54, 55; Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 7957/04, 1348/05 Mara’abe
v. Prime Minister, supra note 171, paras. 7, 16. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note, the International
Court of Justice apparently “refused to regard taking land for the barrier as temporary requisition and saw it
as a form of confiscation,” notwithstanding the fact that the High Court of Justice of Israel has ruled that
confiscation was not involved. See David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of
International Humanitarian Law, 99 AJIL 88, 98 (2005).
385
See, e.g., A Temporary Measure, supra note 132. This prospect of removing barriers in fact caused
grave concerns in Arafat’s office, for instance when Israel would remove most of the barriers and grant
permits for Palestinian cars to travel on by-pass roads on the basis of agreements between Israelis and
regional Palestinian leadership, without Palestinian Authority involvement, in regions in which there were
long periods of calm. See Yoaz & Regular, In the Security Establishment It Was Decided, supra note 149,
at 5A.
386
Written Statement on Jurisdiction and Propriety, sec. 1.8; see Israel’s Response in the Matter
Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al., supra note 14, para. 54.
387
Greer Fay Cashman, Shalom to Foreign Press: Fence Is Not a Wall, THE JERUSALEM POST , Jan. 19,
2004, available at
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1074485518797&p=100
382
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explicitly stated that “[i]f the Palestinians end terror, Israel must stop building the
separation fence.”388 Israel in fact does not even appropriate property from the owners;
rather, it temporarily seizes the property for the dur ation of time required. Ownership of
the land is in no way changed and, Israel says, it will be returned to the owners once the
barrier is removed. In the interim, Israel offers landowners a usage fee according to the
value of the land as determined by assessors. Should the landowner feel that the
assessment is inaccurate or unfair in any way, as explained earlier, he may object to the
assessment and ultimately petition the High Court of Justice.
¶109
“There is no doubt that the establishment of the Seam Zone harms the Palestinian
residents in the zone,”389 explains Justice Beinish, in the Israel High Court of Justice
decision in Ibrahim v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank. She continues to
opine:
Agricultural land will be seized and was seized in order to construct the
obstacle, and the ability of the residents to utilize land in their possession
could be significantly undermined, also their access to the land could be
impeded. This hindrance is an immediate necessity and is a consequence
of the state of warfare prevailing in the Region. 390
Accordingly, renders the Israel High Court of Justice, “[e]ven though the seizure will
cause damage, hardship, and inconvenience to residents, the measures taken are intended
as an important component of the IDF’s conception of combat, which was decided by
those in charge of security . . . .”391
¶110
Even the Protocol I Additional of 1977, which was designed to enhance
humanitarian rights beyond those accorded in the Fourth Geneva Convention, specifically
permits the occupying authority “where required by imperative military necessity,” to
“destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops,
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works,” when “in the
defence of . . . national territory against invasion.”392
¶111
It is beyond question that suicide bombers and other terrorists frequently “invade”
the national territory of Israel. The First Protocol thus specifically recognizes that in the
case of “the defence of its national territory against invasion” (that is, in defence of the
territory of Israel), an Occupying Power may engage in measures “within such territory
under its own control where required by imperative military necessity” (that is, in
occupied territory) otherwise prohibited, such as rendering land useless to the local
population: for instance, the construction of a security fence in those areas as “required
8596981749 (visited July 2, 2005); see Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et
al. v. Prime Minister et al., supra note 14, para. 54; Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ
7957/04, 1348/05 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister, supra note 171, para. 18.
388
Karin Laub, Israel May End Construction of Barrier, THE A SSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 25, 2004),
available at http://www.phillyburbs.com/pb-dyn/news/93-11252004-406512.html (visited July 2, 2005).
389
Ibrahim, supra note 132; see Israel’s Response in the Matter Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v.
Prime Minister et al., supra note 14, paras. 62, 94.
390
Ibrahim, supra note 132.
391
Id.
392
Protocol I, supra note 43, art. 54 (emphasis added).
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by imperative military necessity.”393 Reiterating this, the 2004 British Manual of the Law
of Armed Conflict emphasizes that “[i]n cases of imperative military necessity, a party to
the conflict may depart from the prohibition relating to indispensable objects in order to
defend its national territory from invasion . . . .”394
¶112
In fact, even during peacetime a person may be deprived of his possessions “in the
public interest,” subject of course “to the conditions provided for by law” as well as in
fact “by the general principles of international law.” Furthermore, it is typical that a State
has the right to act as it deems “necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest.” For instance, article 1 of Protocol 1 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms stipulates that
[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall
not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws
as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest . . . .”395
¶113

Moreover, even if the regime of international human rights were applicable to the
conflict between the Palestinians and Israel, the relativity of rights would have to be
properly weighed, and in so doing, property rights and freedom of movement are
certainly inferior to the right to life. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, as previously discussed, demands that the “right to life” of all be
protected – and certainly that includes the right to life of Israelis. The article stipulates
that “[e]very human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”396 Article 2 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms similarly provides that
“[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law,” and that “[n]o one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally . . . .”397 The American Convention on Human Rights, as
well, requires respect for everyone’s life: “Every person has the right to have his life
respected. . . . No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”398 The Human Rights
Committee observed in its general comment in 1984 that “the right to life . . . is the
supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency.
The same right to life is enshrined in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948. It

393

Id. (emphasis added).
U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para.
5.27.1 (emphasis added).
395
Protocol to The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May
18, 1954, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, art. 1, available at http://hei.unige.ch/humanrts/euro/z20prot1.html and
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#P1.Art1 (emphasis added).
396
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 33, art. 6 (emphasis added).
397
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms , supra note 34 art. 2
(emphasis added).
398
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 35, art. 4.
394
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is basic to all human rights.”399 For Israelis, then, the security barrier is a vital method by
which Israel can attempt to secure this most basic and essential human right of all, the
right to live. 400
IX. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT LIMITATIONS
¶114

The Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War of 1949 addresses the restriction of movement of civilians in occupied
territory and in Article 27 explicitly authorizes restrictions on the freedom of movement
by taking “such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may
be necessary as a result of the war.”401 Article 27 is the first article in Section I of Part
III. This section enumerates provisions that are applicable to occupied territories as well
as to the territories of the parties to the conflict, and is appropriately titled Provisions
Common to the Territories of the Parties to the Conflict and to Occupied Territories. 402
Similarly, both the U.S. Army Field Manual on The Law of Land Warfare and the United
Kingdom’s 2004 Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict emphasize international law’s
unequivocal authorization to restrict the movement of civilians in occupied territory.
After repeating verbatim in paragraph 266 of Chapter 5 403 the Fourth Geneva
Conve ntion’s authorization to take the security and control actions as may be necessitated
by war concerning civilians in occupied territory, 404 the U.S. Army Field Manual on The
Law of Land Warfare in Paragraph 379 of Chapter 6, 405 expressly and unambiguously
applies these “measures of control and security” to an occupied territory’s population,
making it clear that the “measures of control and security in regard to protected persons
as may be necessary as a result of the war” are indeed applicable to “the population of
occupied territory.”406 The 2004 Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict of the United
Kingdom, as well, repeats the same concept in similar terms, 407 which Greenspan
likewise reaffirms. 408
¶115
In explaining and interpreting the intent behind the “measures of control and
security” to which civilians may be subjected in accordance with the Fourth Geneva
Convention’s Article 27, Jean S. Pictet, points out that:

399

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 14: Nuclear Weapons
and the Right to Life (Art. 6) (Sep. 11, 1984), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/9c882008fd898da7c12563ed004a3b08?Opendocument
(emphasis added).
400
See, e.g., Andrew F. Tully, Middle East: Security Barrier In West Bank Quickly Becoming A Key
Issue, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (July 30, 2003), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/07/mil-030730-rfel-150354.htm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2005).
401
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 27 (emphasis added).
402
Id. pt. III, sec. I, arts. 27–34.
403
U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, THE LAW OF LAND W ARFARE , supra note 247, para. 266.
404
Id. para. 266
405
Id. para. 379.
406
Id.
407
See U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122,
para. 9.22.
408
GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 168; see also id. at 50.
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[t]he right to personal liberty, and in particular, the right to move about
freely, can naturally be made subject in war time to certain restrictions
made necessary by circumstances. So far as the local population is
concerned, the freedom of movement of civilians of enemy nationality may
certainly be restricted, or even temporarily suppressed, if circumstances
so require. That right is not, therefore, included among the other absolute
rights laid down in the Convention. 409
¶116

Pictet later describes the variety of security and control measures that occupying
States may exercise:
There are a great many measures, ranging from comparatively mild
restrictions such as the duty of registering with and reporting periodically
to the police authorities . . . to harsher provisions such as a prohibition on
any change in place of residence without permission, prohibition of access
to certain areas, restrictions of movement, or even assigned residence and
internment . . . . 410

¶117

Restrictions on free movement, for instance, are permitted the occupying authority
under Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention “[i]f the Occupying Power considers it
necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning
protected persons . . . .”411 The U.S. Army Field Manual The Law of Land Warfare
repeats this same authorization. 412 Pictet explains that the reasoning behind the principle
expressed in Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Conve ntion according to which the
occupying authority may “take safety measures,” when it deems it “necessary, for

409

PICTET , supra note 165, at 201-02 (emphasis added).
Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
411
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 78, (emphasis added). As regards enemy aliens and other
protected persons in the territory of a belligerent, Article 41 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well,
empowers the belligerent to engage in further restrictions on the freedom of movement in the form of
“measures of control”. See id. art. 41 (emphasis added); U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE
LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 9.31. Pictet explains the implication that employing
“measures of control” in the form of “assigned residence” and “internment” has for this restriction of the
freedom of movement of civilians:
The object of assigned residence is to move certain people from their domicile and force them to
live, as long as the circumstances motivating such action continue to exist, in a locality which is
generally out of the way and where supervision is more easily exercised . . . . Internment is also
a form of assigned residence, since internees are detained in a place other than their normal
place of residence.
PICTET , supra note 165, at 256 (emphasis added); see also Geneva Convention IV, supra, note 39, arts. 42
and 46; GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 50. Thus, elucidates Pictet, the Convention sanctions restricting the
freedom of movement of civilians, specifically in the form of “internment” or “in assigned residence” when
there is “serious and legitimate reason to think that they are members of organizations whose object is to
cause disturbances,” or that these civilians “may seriously prejudice its security by other means such as
sabotage or espionage.” PICTET , supra note 165, at 258 (emphasis added).
412
See U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, THE LAW OF LAND W ARFARE , supra note 247, at para. 433; see also
id. paras. 280-281, 285; U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT ,
supra note 122, para. 9.31.
410
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imperative reasons of security,” that affect civilians in occupied territory, is that “[t]he
persons subjected to these measures are not, in theory, involved in the struggle.”413
¶118
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention further specifically demonstrates that
in occup ied territory there may be restriction on the freedom of movement by the
occupying authority if “imperative military reasons so demand.” The second paragraph
of Article 49 stipulates that:
the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given
area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so
demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected
persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for
material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement.414
¶119

The U.S. Army Field Manual The Law of Land Warfare reiterates verbatim the
authorization from Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention for the occupying force
to restrict the freedom of movement. 415 Likewise the 2004 Manual of the Law of Armed
Conflict of the United Kingdom repeats this authorization in a similar manner. 416 Pictet,
as well, repeats the restriction on civilians’ freedom of movement under circumstances of
evacuation that “imperative military reasons so demand” or “when the presence of
protected persons in an area hampers military operations.”417
¶120
Moreover, Paragraph 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention’s Article 49 in fact
explicitly allows an occupying authority to require civilians to remain in a specific
location, even tho ugh they may thereby be exposed to war risks, where “imperative
military reasons so demand”: “The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons
in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population
or imperative military reasons so demand.”418 The U.S. Law of Land Warfare army field
manual, 419 as well as the 2004 British Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict,420 reiterate
this same authorization. Pictet further elaborates on Article 49(5) that
the rule whereby individuals are free to move from place to place is
subject to certain restrictions in wartime. Two such restrictions are
mentioned here: the Occupying Power is entitled to prevent protected
persons from moving, even if they are in an area particularly exposed to
413

PICTET , supra note 165, at 368; see also GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 171-72, 262-63. It should
be clarified, however, that Fourth Geneva Convention Article 78’s language does not limit the “safety
measures” that may be exercised by the occupying authority with respect to civilians when it considers
those measures “necessary, for imperative reasons of security” to “assigned residence” and “internment
“other than by stipulating that “the Occupying Power . . . may, at the most, subject them to assigned
residence or to internment.” Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 78 (emphasis added).
414
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 49(2) (emphasis added).
415
U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, THE LAW OF LAND W ARFARE , supra note 247, para. 382.
416
U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para.
11.55.
417
PICTET , supra note 165, at 280 (emphasis added).
418
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 49(5) (emphasis added),
419
U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, THE LAW OF LAND W ARFARE , supra note 247, para. 382.
420
U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para.
11.55.
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the dangers of war, if the security of the population or imperative military
reasons so demand. 421
¶121

Consequently, concludes Pictet, “two considerations—the security of the
population and ‘imperative military reasons’—may, according to the circumstances,
justify either the evacuation of protected persons . . . or their retention . . . .”422
¶122
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, in stipulating that the occupying power “shall
take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order
and safety,”423 also allows for restrictions on the freedom of movement of civilians in
occupied territory. Thus, according to Gerhard von Glahn, in occupied territory travel
laws, among others, will for instance naturally be altered, repealed, or suspended “in the
interest of [the occupant’s] safety and security.”424 Greenspan similarly points out that it
is normal for the occup ying authority to amend or suspend the right of unrestricted travel
in occupied territory. 425 The occupying power “possesses a right to regulate the
circulation of persons in the occupied enemy territory,” explains von Glahn. “Quite often
additional regulations prohibit travel beyond a certain distance from a person’s domicile,
except on passes granted by the occupation authorities.”426 Likewise, in referring to the
freedom of movement, the U.S. Army Field Manual on The Law of Land Warfare
similarly prescribes that “[t]he occupant may withdraw from individuals the right to
change their residence, restrict freedom of internal movement, forbid visits to certain
districts, prohibit emigration and immigration.”427 The British Manual of the Law of
Armed Conflict from 2004 also in like manner allows restrictions on civilians in the form
of security measures imposed by the occupying power. 428
¶123
The law of warfare thus very much restricts freedom of movement, summarizes
Greenspan:
One of the usual methods of exercising control over the population is to
issue identity cards to all inhabitants. Movement by civilians within the
territory is restricted, and only allowed outside defined areas by a system
of passes. Road blocks are set up at various points to enforce such
regulations. Certain areas may be entirely closed to the inhabitants living
outside them. Entry and exit from the territory is strictly regulated.
Curfews are often imposed . . . . 429

421

PICTET , supra note 165, at 282 (emphasis added).
Id. at 283.
423
Hague Regulations, supra note 168, art. 43 (emphasis added).
424
VON GLAHN, supra note 164, at 98.
425
GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 223.
426
VON GLAHN, supra note 164, at 141 (emphasis added). Moreover, the occupying power has “the
customary rights . . . to prohibit anything tending to promote or stimulate a spirit of resistance or of
hostility on the part of the inhabitants against the new authorities . . . .” Id. at 141.
427
U.S. DEP ’T OF THE A RMY, THE LAW OF LAND W ARFARE , supra note 247, para. 375 (emphasis
added).
428
U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para.
11.37.
429
GREENSPAN, supra note 261, at 233 (emphasis added).
422
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Such restrictions are typical of State practice. During the First World War Allied
occupation of the Rhineland, for instance, when there were fears that the war might reignite, “the military forces took the responsibility for preserving public order,” writes
Ernst Fraenkel, “and the civil liberties of the population were drastically restricted.”430
¶124
Military necessity requiring restrictions on the freedom of movement of inhabitants
of occupied territory may invariably encompass actions taken in defense of the occupying
power. 431 The restriction of movement of civilians is a usual method of exercising
control, during actual fighting as well as in occupied territory. Because an occupying
authority, in those instances where “imperative military reasons so demand,” has the
right and, depending on the circumstances, indeed the obligation to restrict the movement
of civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory, freedom of movement is certainly not a
protected right of civilian inhabitants of occupied territory. As Pictet thus concludes, “the
rule whereby individuals are free to move from place to place is subject to . . . restrictions
in wartime.”432 It is natural that during situations of armed conflict civilian freedom of
movement will be restricted, and Israel’s construction of a security barrier designed to
thwart and deter terrorists from committing violent attacks against Israelis is accordingly
not a contravention of international law in this regard.
¶125
Moreover, even if the international human rights regime were applicable to
occupied territories, it would allow for restrictions, such as a restriction on the freedom of
movement of civilians when “necessary to protect national security” and “public order.”
The first paragraph of article 12, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of 1966 433 prescribes that “[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a
State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence.” Yet, that very same article, two paragraphs later, permits
digression from this venerated principle of free movement, even in times of peace, when
“necessary to protect national security” and “public order”: “The above- mentioned rights
shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or

430

FRAENKEL , supra note 88, at 9.
See, e.g., Hilu, supra note 163, at 178 (Landau, J.); see also HCJ 606, 610/78 Ayoub, , supra note
163, at 117 (Witkon, J.). Moreover, under Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, when a civilian in
occupied territory “is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity
hostile to the security of the Occupying Power . . . [he] shall, in those cases where absolute military security
so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under the present Convention.”
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 5 (emphasis added); see also U.K. M INISTRY OF DEFENCE , THE
M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF A RMED CONFLICT , supra note 122, para. 9.19.
432
PICTET , supra note 165, at 282 (emphasis added).
433
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 33, art. 12. According to the
International Court of Justice,
the construction of the wall and its associated régime impede the liberty of movement of the
inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (with the exception of Israeli citizens and those
assimilated thereto) as guaranteed under Article 12, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. They also impede the exercise by the persons concerned of the
right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 9, sec.
134.
431
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morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights
recognized in the present Covenant.”434
¶126
According to the official commentary on this article 12, while “[l]iberty of
movement is an indispensable condition for the free development of a person,” the article
at the same time
provides for exceptional circumstances in which rights . . . may be
restricted. This provision authorizes the State to restrict these rights only
to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or
morals and the rights and freedoms of others. To be permissible,
restrictions must be provided by law, must be necessary in a democratic
society for the protection of these purposes and must be consistent with all
other rights recognized in the Covenant . . . . [The restrictions] must . . .
be necessary to protect them. Restrictive measures must conform to the
principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their
protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst
those which might achieve the desired result; and they must be
proportionate to the interest to be protected.435
¶127

If this International Covenant were applicable to the disputed territories, and in
light of the deadly suicide bombers and other perpetrators of violence incessantly
terrorizing Israelis, it would thus be a rather strained contention to allege that Israel is not
faced with a situation in which it is not “necessary to protect national security, public
order,” in the terms of paragraph 3, Article 12 exceptions to “the right to liberty of
movement.” Accordingly, the security fence, designed to thwart and frustrate deadly
terrorism and violence carried out against Israelis, is “necessary to protect them.”
Moreover, “restrictive measures” in the form of Israel’s security barrier most definitely
“conform to the principle of proportionality” and are certainly “appropriate to achieve
their protective function.” The barrier is clearly “the least intrusive instrument amongst
those which might achieve the desired result” and beyond doubt it is “proportionate to
the interest to be protected.”436
¶128
This restriction of the freedom of movement is typical under other international
instruments comprising the regime of international human rights law. For instance,
article 2 of Protocol 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, provides that “[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence . . .” and that “[n]o restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights
other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security or public safety for the maintenance of ‘ordre public,’
for the prevention of crime, for the protection of rights and freedoms of others.” In

434

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 33, art. 12, para. 3 (emphasis
added).
435
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, Freedom of Movement (Art.12),
U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999) (emphasis added), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom27.htm (visited June 23, 2005).
436
Cf. id.
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addition, “the right to liberty of movement” is “subject, in particular areas, to restrictions
imposes [sic] in accordance with law and justified by the public interest in a democratic
society.”437
¶129
Beyond restrictions on “the right to liberty of movement ” when “necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security,” Protocol 4 to the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms permits restrictions on “the
right to liberty of movement” when “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety for the maintenance of ‘ordre public’, for the prevention of crime, for the
protection of rights and freedoms of others.” It would be quite specious to argue that
terrorism perpetrated against Israelis is neither a matter of public safety nor a crime, the
prevention of which is “necessary in a democratic society,” which would consequently
permit restricting “the right to liberty of movement .” Moreover, according to Protocol 4,
if “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety
. . . for the protection of rights and freedoms of others”—say Israelis’ right to life, for
example— the “right to liberty of movement” may also be restricted. Article 2 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms specifically
provides that “[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law,” and that “[n]o one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally . . . .”438 It would thus be spurious to claim that
Israel has no “public interest” in protecting its citizens’ “right to life” by obstructing and
preventing the perpetration of terrorist atrocities within its “democratic society” in a
manner such as would restrict “the right to liberty of movement”, that is, by constructing
a security barrier the consequences of which would protect the “right to life” of Israelis.
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also protects the
“right to life” as such: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall
be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”439 The Human
Rights Committee observes in its general comment in 1982 that
the right to life enunciated in the first paragraph of article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is the supreme right
from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency.
The same right to life is enshrined in article 3 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on 10 December 1948. It is basic to all human rights. 440
¶130

Also, though phrased more generally, but nonetheless applicable, article 4 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), lays down that
[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the
437
Protocol 4 of THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
(1950), Council of Europe, http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#C.Art2, art. 2 (emphasis added).
438
Id. (emphasis added).
439
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 33, at, art. 6 (emphasis added),.
440
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 14: Nuclear Weapons
and the Right to Life (Art. 6): 09/11/84, CCPR General Comment 14. (General Comments), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/9c882008fd898da7c12563ed004a3b08?Opendocument (last
visited June 23, 2005).
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present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their
other obligations under international law and do not involve
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion
or social origin. 441
The official 1981 Commentary on that article indicates that “[w]hen a public emergency
which threatens the life of a nation arises and it is officially proclaimed, a State party may
derogate from a number of rights to the extent strictly required by the situation.”442 In
2001, the commentary on the permitted derogations in article 4 recognized and
acknowledged the possibility of derogation from application in times of war:
The Covenant requires that even during an armed conflict measures
derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that the
situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation. If States parties
consider invoking article 4 in other situations than an armed conflict, they
should carefully consider the justification and why such a measure is
necessary and legitimate in the circumstances. 443
¶131

According to the 2001 commentary on article 4, “the obligation to limit any
derogations to those strictly required by the exigencies of the situation reflects the
principle of proportionality which is common to derogation and limitation powers,”444
which principle would undoubtedly be preserved in the building of a security barrier.
¶132
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights moreover does not
categorize “the right to liberty of movement ” in such a category as to be a right from
which “no derogation” is permitted under article 4, paragraph 2, as is the case with other
rights, 445 such as the right to life in article 6; the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading punishment, or of medical or scientific experimentation without consent
under article 7; prohibition of slavery, slave-trade and servitude under article 8,
paragraphs 1 and 2; prohibition of imprisonment because of inability to fulfill a
contractual obligation under article 11; the principle of legality in the field of criminal
law, i.e. the requirement of both criminal liability and punishment being limited to clear
and precise provisions in the law that was in place and applicable at the time the act or
omission took place, except in cases where a later law imposes a lighter penalty under
article 15; the recognition of everyone as a person before the law under article 16; and

441

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 33, art. 4.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Derogation of Rights (Art. 4): 31/07/81, CCPR
General Comment 5 (1981), General Commentary,
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CCPR+General+comment+5.En?OpenDocument.
443
General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency (article 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31,
2001) (General Comment on Article 4 adopted at the 1950th meeting, on July 24, 2001), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/71eba4be3974b4f7c1256ae20051
7361/$FILE/G0144470.doc (visited June 23, 2005) [hereinafter General Comment No. 29 States of
Emergency].
444
Id.
445
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 33, art. 4 (emphasis added).
442
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freedom of thought, conscience and religion under article 18, which are considered
sacrosanct and “non-derogable by the very fact that they are listed in article 4, paragraph
2.”446
X. CONCLUSION
¶133

Even if the regime of international human rights were applicable to occupied
territories, the overwhelming majority of persons in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are
living under direct Palestinian control and thus are not subject to the jurisdiction of Israel
as a result of the transfer to the Palestinian Authority of responsibility and authority over
them pursuant to various international agreements between the Palestinians and Israel.
¶134
Furthermore, the regime of international humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflict situations and the regime of international human rights applicable in peacetime
are mutually exclusive since there is a distinct contradiction between them. The
government of an occupying authority over an occupied territory is different from the
government of a State over its own territory. The objective of belligerent occupation is
not the occupied population’s welfare, and human rights applicable during peace are in
abeyance throughout the military occupation. During war, the international legal
standards that apply are not always the same as the legal standards that apply during
peace.
¶135
Although the protection of the individual is paramount both in the regime of
international human rights law as well as in the international humanitarian law regime,
they are significantly different one from the other. Disparate and special human rights,
stemming from the extraordinary circumstances surrounding war, are created as the result
of war and operate in place of those suspended. The laws of war strive to maintain an
appropriate balance between humanity and military necessity, and the international
humanitarian law regime was developed with such armed conflicts in mind. In fact,
given that international humanitarian law developed in light of military considerations,
from a purely practical standpoint there is actually a greater likelihood of compliance
with it thereby ensuring more of a chance that human beings will actually be better
protected during armed conflict situations than would happen under a regime of vague
human rights. International humanitarian law is thus more suitable to address
humanitarian issues of the nature that arise in armed conflict and the relationship between
a State and the citizens of its adversary than international human rights law. For human
rights to be more effectively protected during war, the more inclusive and better coverage
designed for the unique situation of wartime is consequently afforded by the
humanitarian law specifically adapted for war.
¶136
From the onset of the Palestinian violence in 2000, it was the Palestinian leadership
itself that incited, financed, stimulated, encouraged, and promoted terrorism against
Israeli targets, and the Palestinian Authority refused to take appropriate and effective
action against the terrorists, which as a consequence has forced Israel to construct the
security barrier. 447 Their actions (and omissions) have even substantially determined its
route. 448
446

General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency, supra note 443, art. 4.
It certainly should be realized, nevertheless, that no barrier can provide an ultimate, absolute answer
to all forms of violence and terrorism [see Amidror, supra note 117; Israel’s Response in the Matter
447

301

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

¶137

[2005

The concept behind a security barrier as a vital element in combating terrorists is to
create an obstacle between the majority of the Palestinian inhabitants of the disputed
territories and the majority of Israelis. Hampering terrorist incursions thereby facilitates
the defense of the Israeli civilian population. 449 At the same time, however, Israel is
striving to maintain a proper balance between legitimate security concerns on the one
hand and property restrictions and ensuing limitations on free movement on the other. In
a situation of armed conflict, just as under a regime of belligerent occupation, it
nevertheless is the duty, in addition to the right, of both the belligerent power as well as
the occupying authority to engage in those military measures necessary to accomplish the
purpose of the war, even though the methods employed to realize the war aims may as a
matter of course require the limitation of the use of property through its seizure or even
destruction as well as the limitation of free movement.

Concerning HCJ 4825/04 Alian et al. v. Prime Minister et al., supra note 14, para. 59]; missiles and mortars
are not deterred by it and necessary action undertaken by the Israeli army may even be hindered by it. See
Amidror, supra note 117; see also Szymanski, supra note 127.
448
Similarly, the first in the list of Basic Objectives of Military Government issued in April 1945 in a
directive to the Commanding General of the United States occupation forces in Germany during World
War II was to bring “home to the Germans that Germany’s ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi
resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the
Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.” Directive to
Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of
Germany, supra note 298, para. 4(a).
449.
See Ministry of Defence, Israel’s Security Fence: Purpose (2004),
http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/purpose.htm (visited Nov. 20, 2005); Not a Border, supra
note 130.
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